Harmonizing Business Laws in Africa: OHADA Calls the Tune by Dickerson, Claire M.
Draft 031605
1
Draft: please do not cite or quote without author=s permission
Final to be published at 44:1 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2005)
HARMONIZING BUSINESS LAWS IN AFRICA: OHADA CALLS THE TUNE
Claire Moore Dickerson*
INTRODUCTION
Economic development in sub-Saharan Africa, including West Africa, has challenged 
development economists and legal scholars for decades.  Starting in 1993, sixteen West African 
countries have taken a revolutionary step.  They are addressing the problem themselves, jointly.  
Each agreed to give up some national sovereignty in order to establish a single, cross-border 
regime of uniform business laws, immediately applicable as the domestic laws of each country.  
These are the OHADA (in English, the Organization for Harmonization in Africa of Business 
Laws) laws, adopted pursuant to the 1993 OHADA treaty.1
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1Traité relatif à l=Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires, 4 JOURNAL OFFICIEL (JO) OHADA 1 
(Nov. 1, 1997), available at http://www.ohada.com/traite.php?categorie=10 (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). The law 
promulgated under the treaty and relating to business associations was adopted April 17, 1997, effective January 1, 
1998.  Companies and Agroupements d=intérêt économique@ in existence before January 1, 1998, were accorded an 
additional two years before their constitutional documents had to conform to the OHADA law of corporations and 
other associations; however, even these businesses were otherwise subject to OHADA laws upon the effective date.  
See Act Uniforme relatif au Droit des Sociétés Commerciales et du Groupement d=Intérêt Economique, art. 908, 2 JO 
OHADA 1 (Oct. 1, 1997), available at http://www.ohada.com/textes.php?categorie=457 (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
The charter members of OHADA are Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Cameroon, 
Comores, Congo, Côte d=Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo; Guinea and Guinea-
Bissau joined subsequently; all are francophone except for Cameroon (bilingual English-French), Equatorial Guinea 
(Spanish) and Guinea-Bissau (Portuguese).  See Xavier Forneris, Harmonising Commercial Law in Africa: the 
OHADA (MS on file with author) at 2.   There are other unifying organizations in the region.  There are, for example, 
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The OHADA laws= articulated purpose is to facilitate investment in general, and foreign 
investment in particular.2  These laws are adapted to the needs of a developing economy, and 
modernize the chiefly French-system, century-old business laws previously applicable in the 
OHADA states.  OHADA may materially change the investment climate in West Africa.  If 
successful, it offers a model for development in other parts of the developing world.  This article 
presents the first focused analysis of OHADA=s laws and institutions to appear in a United States 
law review.  In addition, it rebuts common criticisms of the system and offers some early 
prognoses on the likelihood of OHADA=s success and on its potential impact.
The OHADA laws retain the strong French flavor of their predecessors.3  As I explain in 
two overlapping monetary unions.  Joseph Issa-Sayegh, Quelques Aspects Techniques de l=Intégration Juridique: 
l=Exemple des Acts Uniformes de l=OHADA, 1 REV. DR. UNIF. 5, 7 (1999) (discussing the UEMOA (Union 
Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine), which includes seven of the OHADA countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Côte d=Ivoire, Mali, Niger , Senegal and Togo).  See also BORIS MARTOR, NANETTE PILKINGTON, DAVID S. SELLERS 
& SÉBASTIEN THOUVENOT, BUSINESS LAW IN AFRICA: OHADA AND THE HARMONIZATION PROCESS 295-97 (2002) 
(hereinafter BUSLAW) (discussing ECOWAS (in French, CEDEAO), the Economic Community of West African 
States, to which Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d=Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, from 
OHADA belong, as well as Cap Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone; a merger with UEMOA, 
which is more advanced had been contemplated for 2004, but will not occur within that time).  There is another 
major economic organization that includes OHADA countries, the CEMAC (Communauté Economique et Monétaire 
de l=Afrique Centrale), which includes Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea 
and Gabon, all OHADA members.  See BUSLAW, supra at 293.  There is also, of course, the African Union itself; its 
website is at http://www.africa-union.org.
2The OHADA drafters= articulated goal for their legislation is increased foreign investment in order to 
enhance economic development.  See, e.g., Jacqueline Lohoues-Oble, L=Apparition d=un Droit International des 
Affaires en Afrique, 3 REV. IND. DR. COM. 543, 544-47 (1999); see also Philippe LeBoulanger, L=Arbitrage et 
l=Harmonisation du Droit des Affaires en Afrique, 3 REV. ARBITRAGE 541, 544 (1999) (describing the founders=
efforts to Aélaborer un droit régional des affaires unique, moderne, susceptible de favoirser le développement 
économique@ (in English: to prepare a regional system of laws, unique, modern, and susceptible of favoring 
economic development). See also Martin Kirsch, Historique de l=Organisation pour l=Harmonisation du Droit des 
Affaires en Afrique [sic] (OHADA), REVUE PENANT 130 (1998) (noting that the author, together with Judge Kéba 
Mbaye and a third, were the ADirectoire@ authorized at a conference of heads of state, together with a delegation from 
France, to launch the OHADA project; the Directoire kept in mind that the economic development sought by the 
heads of state would occur only if the Ainsécurité juridique et judiciaire@ were corrected).
3See, e.g., MAMADOU KONE, LE NOUVEAU DROIT COMMERCIAL DES PAYS DE LA ZONE OHADA; 
COMPARAISONS AVEC LE DROIT FRANÇAIS 16 (2003) (noting that OHADA is based on the French system). See 
generally, infra, Part II.A (analyzing the OHADA business laws).
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Part I, recent economic scholarship has asserted that the French legal system may be less 
favorable to investment than the common law system.  This understanding is consistent with 
traditional theories in comparative law.  Drawing on other studies I show that a French legal 
system is at worst neutral as compared to the common law system. 
Underlying these economists= critique is a principally neo-liberal approach to 
development that emphasizes liberalizing flows of goods and capital.  The OHADA regime, 
which I describe in Part II, is agnostic on the topic.  While each member-state has committed to 
OHADA as its business law regime, the state=s political system remains free to adopt a neo-
liberal route to development or to be more actively involved in national economic and social 
structures.4  For its part, the OHADA laws and institutions are committed to enhancing private 
ordering, to creating a reliable, usable system that responds to the needs of a developing 
economy, whatever the surrounding political reality.  As Part II emphasizes, OHADA=s central 
accomplishment is the growing system of modern, business-related statutes.  These are supported 
by an entire regime: a legislature to adopt a full panoply of business laws, a supranational court 
that preserves the laws= uniformity by issuing decisions and interpretations applicable throughout 
the OHADA territory, and a permanent secretariat to perform an executive function compatible 
with OHADA=s parliamentary-style governance. 
Parts II and III also address a non-economic criticism of the OHADA regime: that it is 
neocolonial because it bears the influence of a Northern legal system.5  No definitive response is 
4See, e.g., José Antonio Ocampo, Development and the Global Order in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT 
ECONOMICS 82 (Ha-Joon Chang, ed., 2003) (offering an alternative to the neo-liberal paradigm).
5I heard the most unequivocal assertion of neo-colonialism second-hand.  Apparently, a senior official at a 
major international financial institution has resisted providing funding to OHADA because he considers it neo-
colonialist.  Interview with KG in Washington, D.C., on December 13, 2004 (discussing funding for OHADA).
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possible, of course, but Part II describes how the member-states acceded to the OHADA Treaty 
through their respective political systems.  Moreover, the legal professionals who work within 
the region and use the OHADA laws similarly indicate an affirmative commitment to OHADA.   
In the summer of 2004, I conducted interviews with lawyers, judges and academics in the region, 
These professionals even spoke of their admiration for the elegance and simplicity of the 
OHADA laws.6  As Part II points out, these professionals show that they accept the principle and 
reality of OHADA when they seek to strengthen both the interface between OHADA and the 
national judicial regimes, and certain aspects of OHADA=s own institutional structure.
What are the long-term effects of the OHADA regime?  Because the laws are uniform, 
because their Northern form is familiar both to foreigners and to the regional bar and bench, and 
because they are clear and accessible, they reduce transaction costs into the region and among the 
6I conducted 33 interviews in West Africa.  Six were in Dakar, Senegal.  In Dakar, the interviewees 
included four Senegalese (one practitioner, one in-house counsel, one senior bureaucrat in the Ministry of Justice, 
and the Hon. Kéba Mbaye, who is a former Vice Chair of the International Court of Justice in the Hague, a former 
justice on Senegal=s highest court, and motivating force behind OHADA.  The other two interviewees in Dakar were 
a French tax specialist and an economics officer at the US Consulate.  Ten interviews were in Abidjan, Côte d=Ivoire; 
nine of the interviewees were Ivoirian, and the tenth was a US economics officer at the US embassy.  The nine local 
persons were two practitioners, two in-house counsel, one senior bureaucrat in the Ministry of Justice, three judges 
(including one from the OHADA CCJA) and one professor.  In Cameroon, I interviewed twenty-nine people in three 
cities: thirteen (one by telephone) in Douala, the commercial capital; six in Buéa, arguably the commercial capital of 
the anglophone part of Cameroon; and ten in Yaoundé, Cameroon=s political capital; Douala and Yaoundé are 
francophone.  All of the interviewees were Cameroonian except for the economics officer at the US Consulate in 
Douala, who is Nigerian, and one professors and one student I met in Yaoundé, both of whom also are Nigerian.  In 
Douala, I interviewed three judges, five practitioners, two in-house counsel, one senior officer in a US-based bank 
and the US economics officer.  In Buéa, I interviewed one judge, one in-house counsel, and four business people.  In 
Yaoundé, I interviewed four professors (one Nigerian, one from Buéa, one from Yaoundé II, and one from 
Dschang), two judges, one high-level bureaucrat from the OHADA structure, one practitioner, and two students (one 
Nigerian, and the other from Buéa).
Most of these professionals had trained in a French-source legal system, but a few had received an 
essentially common-law education. *Under its constitution, Cameroon is bilingual (French and English) and bi-jural. 
Available in English at http://confinder.richmond.edu/Cameroon.htm (last visited March 1, 2005), and in French at 
http://www.camnet.cm/celcom/institut/constitu/consti%7E1.htm (last visited March 1, 2005).  There is an English-
language, common-law university in Buéa, Cameroon.
In this article, I have fully identified some of the interviewees but in the main have not done so.  Notes are 
on file with author.
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states within the OHADA territory.  Because legal professionals in the region respect the quality 
and integrity of the decisions of OHADA=s supranational court, transaction costs may well fall 
further.  Potential investors, both domestic and foreign, have greater assurance that their private 
arrangements will be respected.
But OHADA may accomplish much more.  It may prove to be an invaluable and 
exportable tool for the South because its uniform business laws presenting a unified face to the 
commercial power of the North.  As Part III emphasizes, the first OHADA laws became effective 
only in 1998, and we cannot yet be certain of the OHADA regime=s impact.  However, if it is 
successful in West Africa, it can be a model within the developing world, especially in other 
African countries because of their proximity, but also in any region with a civilian legal system.  
Latin America, for example, could benefit directly, since its legal systems trace their roots back 
to France.7  The early indications are mixed, but offer reason for optimism.
I. THE OHADA LAWS AND DEVELOPMENT
The OHADA regime offers both an example and a laboratory.  It illustrates an approach, 
and although the experience is still young, half-a-dozen years is a beginning. At the time when 
the OHADA Treaty was signed, most of the signatories already had in place a French-based legal 
7See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and 
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1118 (1998) (discussing the influence of the French legal Afamily@on Spanish and 
Portuguese law); George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683, 697 
(1998) (discussing the French influence in the laws of Latin American countries); Richard Azarnia, Tort Law in 
France: A Cultural and Comparative Overview, 13 WIS. INT=L L.J. 471, 472 n.6 (1995) (noting the Napoleonic 
Code=s influence in former French colonies, and in Latin America); Victor Ml. Garita, Conceptual Basis for a New 
Arbitral Statute for Costa Rica: A New Approach in Latin America, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1633, 1642 (1991) (asserting 
that Spain was the Abridge@ between French law and Latin America).
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system, albeit not necessarily the most recent version,8 and OHADA itself is heavily based on the 
French legal system.9  Can it really be expected to attract foreign investment as its drafters 
anticipated?  More broadly, can it be a pro-development tool?
A. DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: THE RULE OF LAW
The problem of development is intractable.10  Since World War II, the best minds in 
8See, e.g., KONÉ, supra note 3 at 10-11.  Guinea Bissau was a longtime Portuguese colony, and Equatorial 
Guinea a Spanish colony.  See Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note, Guinea-Bissau, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5454.htm (April 2004) (last visited Aug. 3, 2004); CIA, Equitorial Guinea, WORLD 
FACTBOOK (May 11, 2004), available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ek.html (last visited Aug. 
4, 2004).  These, in their turn, trace their origins to the French system.  See, e.g., La Porta, et al., supra note 7 at 
1118 (discussing the influence of the French legal Afamily@on Spanish and Portuguese law).
9See KONÉ, supra note 3 at 16 (OHADA=s similarity to French law).  A legendary reformer of French law 
has described that law as rigid and inflexible.  PHILIPPE MARINI, LA MODERNISATION DU DROIT DES SOCIÉTÉS 19-21 
(1996) (acknowledging that the trend of French corporate law has been toward greater flexibility).  But see Naomi R. 
Lamoureaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Legal Regime and Business=s Organizational Choice: A Comparison of 
France and the United States during the Mid-Nineteenth Century (February 2004),  AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10288.pdf (downloaded Mar.23, 2004) (arguing that the 
French legal system=s plethora of business forms actually provided flexibility, and that the flexibility that had 
developed in the US system by the end of the 20th century was due not to the common law=s graceful evolution, but 
to statutory changes).  Lamoreaux and Rosenthal suggest that the correlation between French law and developing 
countries= economic stagnation may indicate that the French system operates differently in developing countries as 
compared to France.  Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra at 28 (speculating on different effects in developing countries).
10The definition of development is not easy either.  For purposes of this article, I use economic growth as a 
proxy for development.  Because economic growth increases the size of the pie, it is likely to contribute to indicators 
of development.  For example, it is likely to reduce mortality, to increase life expectancy and, generally, to 
contribute to human capability. For a discussion of a definition of development, consider the assertion of Jeffrey 
Sachs and his co-authors that development can be measured by analyzing a combination of gross national income 
(the World Bank=s replacement for gross domestic product), average annual growth in gross domestic product per 
capita, life expectancy at birth, under-five mortality rate, and the annual growth of the population Jeffrey Sachs, John 
W. MacArthur, Guido Schmidt-Traub, Margaret Kruk, Chandrika Bahadur, Michael Faye & Gordon McCord, 
Ending Africa=s Poverty Trap, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 117, 118 (2004) (selecting certain 
indicators of development).  Amartya Sen speaks in terms of Ahuman capability.@ The goal is to achieve a society 
wherein people can live the life they would plan for themselves, which means that the social structures.  Importantly, 
the question is not whether the individual in fact so functions; rather, the issue is whether he or she has the choice to 
do so.  AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 30-31 (1982) (discussing capability as the ability to 
function as the individual wishes); Sen, Choice, 30-31 (capability as functioning, as choice). To have capability 
means Abeing adequately nourished and being free from avoidable disease,@ but it also means Abeing able to take part 
in the life of the community and having self-respect.@  Government structures should support this effort, but do so by 
focusing on the individual instead of systems.  AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 75, 144 (1999). 
(discussing capability as a kind of freedom and the state=s role in supporting the capabilities of education and 
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development economics have promoted a neoliberal agenda.11  The result of neoliberalism has 
been disappointing for sub-Saharan Africa, a geographic area that includes West Africa in 
general and the OHADA territory in particular.  Despite the influence of neoliberal ideology, the 
region has lost ground compared with other parts of the world.12  While direct investment to the 
developing world increased substantially in the last two decades of the twentieth century, the 
portion of world-wide capital and goods flowing into sub-Saharan Africa has shrunk by almost 
two-thirds in that period.13  The region=s experience in trade of goods has been no more 
satisfactory.  In those same last two decades, exports from sub-Saharan Africa actually fell even 
when measured in nominal dollars.  Excluding South Africa, exports of manufactured goods 
from sub-Saharan Africa did not manage to rise by even ten percent.14  This double failure is 
particularly devastating given the evidence that a free flow of both capital and goods correlates 
welfare).  For others, the right to development focuses on the rights of states, with a strong sense that each state has 
the right to determine its own meaning of Adevelopment.@ See, e.g., Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Right to 
Development in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 1117 (Mohammed Bedjaoui, ed., 1991) at 
1182 (describing the right to development in the context of the right of a state as against other states).  As noted in 
the Introduction, the precise definition of development is not essential to this paper because OHADA focuses on 
private ordering and is neutral as to how the a national government relates to investors, whether foreign or domestic, 
in terms of conditions and the like.  While no regime can force a national government to respect its obligations under 
domestic and international law, the OHADA regimeBlike any otherBhas to operate with the expectation that it will do 
so. 
11Ha-Joon Chang, Rethinking Development Economics: An Introduction in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT 
ECONOMICS (Ha-Joon Chang, ed. 2003) at 1, 1-3 (noting that neoliberal development economics has been dominated 
by calls for Aextensive privatization, radical deregulation, total opening-up of goods and capital markets, and 
tightening of macroeconomic policy@).
12See, e.g., Sachs et al., supra note 10 at 118 (discussing failure of development in sub-Saharan Africa).
13Howard Stein, Rethinking African Development in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (Ha-Joon 
Chang, ed. 2003) at 153, 154 (discussing foreign direct investment).  Africa-to-Africa foreign private investment, as 
distinguished from classic North-to-South investment, may be a very important potential source of funds for the 
OHADA territory.   See Nicole Itano, South African Companies Fill a Void, NY TIMES (Nov. 4, 2003) (describing 
South African companies= investment within Africa).
14Stein, supra note 13 at 155-56.  Meantime, total world trade tripled, and percentage of manufactured 
goods exported by East Asian an Pacific countries increased from 52% to 78%.
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positively with economic development.15  And even if a developing country rejects the pure 
neoliberal insistence on a wholly free-flow of capital and goods, and chooses instead to retain 
some barriers to trade, for example in  order to protect an evolving industry, the ability to engage 
in global trade nevertheless correlates positively with economic growth.16
Despite (or because of) the neoliberal efforts, the region has suffered from a lack of 
financial resources.  The gap between gross national savings and domestic investment has 
continued to grow; inevitably gross domestic investment has decreased.  In order to support even 
this reduced level of investment, sub-Saharan Africa has had to resort to government debt to 
replace the missing private capital inflows, resulting in brutal debt-to-export ratios.17  In the final 
two decades of the last century, gross national product fell; in real terms, per-capita gross 
national product fell almost forty percent.18  Clearly, the neoliberal efforts have foundered.19
15Raghuran G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Great Reversals: The Politics of Economic Development in the 
Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN=L. ECON. 5, 22, 24, 37, 45 (2003) (discussing free flow of goods and capital as a means 
of reducing interest groups= opposition to financial development).
16See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 17 (2002) (emphasizing that Arapid@
liberalization of trade or capital can leave a developing country vulnerable and, among other consequences, destroy 
jobs).   See also Ha-Joon Chang, Only Protection Can Build Developing Economies; Unfree Global Markets, LE 
MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (Aug. 2003), available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/econ/2003/08freetradehistory.htm (downloaded Feb. 25, 2005) (asserting that 
some protectionism is essential to development).  Access to markets, however, is important.  See, e.g., Sachs, et al., 
supra note 10 at 131 (discussing the correlation between access to a larger market and economic growth).
17Stein, supra note 13 at 157
18Id. at 158 (Per capita GNP fell by 39% from 1980 to 2000)
19The OHADA drafters= articulated goal for their legislation is increased foreign investment in order to 
enhance economic development.  See supra note 2.  That goal focuses the discussion here.  Nevertheless, a complete 
analysis should consider whether economic development is itself a proxy for some other value.  For example, for 
Amartya Sen the ultimate goal to enhance human capability, that is, to promote each person=s ability to function as 
the individual wishes.  SEN, CHOICE, supra note 10 at 30-31; SEN, FREEDOM, supra note 10 at 74-75.  This concept 
means not only an increase in per capita income so that the person in fact possesses viable choices (opportunities), 
but also the freedom B political and social B so that the person can as a practical matter function as he or she wishes. 
SEN, FREEDOM, supra note 10 at 290-91.
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The question now is whether a new inflow of foreign investment, presumably configured 
differently from past transfers, could improve on that realityBor at least play a part in such a 
change.20  And, if the answer is affirmative, to what extent can a legal regime play a positive 
role?  Perhaps it is indeed true that the focus must be on manufacturing, by analogy to the Asian 
experience where manufacturing was the engine for development.21  This, however, cannot be the 
only answer: before 2000, the Côte d=Ivoire was sub-Saharan Africa=s second most industrialized 
country, after only South Africa.22  Nevertheless, the Côte d=Ivoire=s per capita gross national 
income fell from US$ 1,140 in 1980 to US$ 600 in 2000Band that was before the disastrous civil 
war that has torn the country since September 19, 2002.23  The real learning may be that while 
foreign investment will be essential as a source of funds, equally critical is a fundamental change 
in the social institutions.  Ultimately, the goal is to promote trade, and specifically to increase 
exports in order to generate additional resources from outside the region.24  In this regard 
20See, e.g., Sachs et al., supra note 10 at 167 et seq.(proposing a comprehensive set of terms for donor-
recipient agreements geared to reduce poverty within the nation receiving foreign investment).
21Id. [Stein, supra note 13 at 169.  Aoviding reliance on the export of primary goods skirts the risk of 
immiserizing growth.  See also PETER H. LINDERT & CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 81-
104 (7th ed. 1982) (discussing Aimmiserizing growth@).
22Jean-Paul Azam, Marie-Françoise Calmette, Catherine Loustalan & Christine Maurel, Domestic 
Competition and Export Performance of Manufacturing Firms in Côte d=Ivoire 16 (July 2000), available at 
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/2001-01text.pdf (downloaded Dec. 1, 2003).
232000 World Development Indicators CD-ROM, World Bank (Côte d=Ivoire).  For a definition of gross 
national income, see infra note 172.  The use of year 2000 is important because it pre-dates the recent, devastating 
civil unrest in the Côte d=Ivoire, which did not begin in earnest until September 19, 2002.  See, e.g., United Nations 
Mission in Côte d=Ivoire (MINUCI), Background, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/minuci/background.html (last visited April 2, 2004) (discussing the civil 
unrest).  See also Human Rights Watch, Trapped Between Two Wars: Violence Against Civilians in Western Côte 
d=Ivoire (August 2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/cotedivoire0803/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2005) 
(describing the history and consequences of the civil war in the Côte d=Ivoire).
24See Rajan & Zigales, supra note 15 at 5, 22, 24, 36-39 & 45 (asserting that economic development is 
positively correlated with a free flow of both capital and goods).  See also Stein, supra note 13 at 170-71 (noting that 
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formalization of local capital investment, too, may be important in its own right, and not just as a 
means to the foreign-investment end.  The revised institutions can be structured to encourage 
domestic economic development: once the basic social institutions have proved to be conducive 
to local commerce, the political, economic and social institutions will be in a position to attract 
foreign investment.  
The Peruvian economist, Hernando de Soto, has estimated that over half the economic 
output of developing countries is generated from extralegal sectors, and that the poor have 
unofficial, extralegal interests in over US$90 trillion of real estate in the developing world.25
The problem is to harness that wealth: in the developed world, as much as seventy percent of 
credit used in new businesses is generated through loans secured by mortgages.26  The informal 
economy is significant in the OHADA territory, too;27 a commercial law that integrates the 
informal economy into the formal one may help put existing capital to work.
If properly designed, the law could have strong pro-development effects by both 
encouraging capital investment and facilitating trade.28  As the law improves its predictability, it 
both affects and is affected by behaviors and norms, ideally creating and supporting a pro-
these reform efforts will include a combination of private and governmental efforts).  But see STIGLITZ, supra note 16 
at 17 (advising against a developing country=s Arapid liberalization@ of trade and capital).
25HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS 
EVERYWHERE ELSE 85 (2000) (discussing extralegal sectors); id. at 35 (discussing unofficial real estate interests).
26Id. at 84.
27For example, in the Côte d=Ivoire.  See Jean-Pierre Lachaud, Le Secteur Informel Urbain et 
l=Informatisation du Travail en Afrique: Rhétorique et Réalités; Le Cas de la Côte d=Ivoire, Working Paper #5 
(1997), available at http://ced.u-bordeaux4.fr/ (downloaded Jan. 19, 2004) (describing the Côte d=Ivoire=s informal 
economies and their increasing size).
28Rajan & Zingales, supra note 15 at 36-39 (discussing the correlation between economic development and 
the free flow of goods and capital).
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development virtuous cycle.29  I am not asserting that business law by itself can solve all 
problems.30  However, it can be part of the solution.  For example, if law helps create a 
commercial environment where expectations are meaningful because corruption does not trump 
overt arrangements, domestic and foreign investment and trade, including exports, become less 
costly.31
B. COMPARATIVE LAW=S CHALLENGE TO OHADA=S FRENCH-CIVILIAN ORIGINS
Even if law can be a tool for development, is OHADA the appropriate flavor of law?  For 
historical reasons, namely that the original treaty members were almost all former French 
colonies, and that the outliers shared a civilian law heritage, the OHADA laws are clearly and 
frankly based on French business laws.  Both the laws and the structure of OHADA are a work in 
progress but, before espousing continuing support for those laws in their West African context, 
and certainly before encouraging their extension to anglophone neighbors and even to new civil 
law arenas such as Latin America, we must consider their efficacy.  Older comparative-law 
29The Uniform Commercial Code describes Acertainty and predictability [as] underlying modern commercial 
law.@  U.C.C. '1-301 cmt. 6 (2002).  For a discussion of the relationship between evolving norms and laws, see 
generally Claire M. Dickerson, Ozymandias As a Community Project: Managerial/Corporate Social Responsibility 
and the Failure of Transparency, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1035 (2003) (discussing the feed-back loop between societal 
norms and governmental statutory, regulatory and judicial actions, in the context of corporate governance).
30There are so many possible impediments to development, including the extent of ethnic divisions within a 
region.  See William Easterly & Ross Levine, Africa=s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions, 112 Q.J. 
ECON. 1203, 1220, 1241 (1997) (arguing that there is an inverse correlation between ethnic divisions and economic 
development; 4 of the soon 17 members of OHADA are among the 15 most ethnically diverse states from among 66 
studied worldwide).  While business law broadly defined can address issues of discrimination, obviously, it cannot 
remove ethnic differences.
Consider also the devastating impact of AIDS in the region.  See, e.g., Lori Bollinger, John Stover & 
Benjamin Zanou, L=Impact Economique du SIDA en Côte d=Ivoire: Résultats d=un Examen de la Littérature, (Sept. 
1999), available at http://www.policyproject.com/pubs/SEImpact/ivoirebr.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2004)
31See Stein, supra note 13 at 170-71 (discussing the importance of transparency and trust, among other 
factors).
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literature has suggested that the civil law system, and in particular French laws, do not travel 
well.  If, as the analysis asserts,  French law indeed impedes development, OHADA is a doubtful 
choice for implementing the role of law as a path to development.  Fortunately for the OHADA 
members, modern analysis suggests that the French legal system only correlates negatively with 
development, but does not impede it.
1. Law and Finance theory
The older of comparative law=s two flavors of theoretic lens is the law and finance theory. 
 First articulated almost half a century ago,32 this theory has been powerfully restated in the past 
half-dozen years by a team of economists.33  According to the law and finance theory, countries 
having inherited the civil-law system, and in particular the French civil-law system, will tend to 
be less economically successful than countries having inherited the British, or common-law 
system.34 The focus here is on the legal system. 
The argument that French-based law is inappropriate to a developing economy is 
32FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 54-70 (1960) (discussing the different conceptions 
of liberty and property inherent in the British versus French legal systems); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, 
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
(1973).  See also Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Ross Levine, Law, Endowments and Finance, 70 J. FIN=L 
ECON. 138-39 (2003) (discussing the law and finance theory).
33See La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7.  The importance of this perspective is underscored by 
the wide-ranging interest it has garnered, as evidenced by a discussion in a magazine of relatively general circulation. 
See Nicholas Thompson, Common Denominator, 2005-FEBLEGAL AFF. 46 (discussing the Shleifer and Visney=s law 
and finance theory, referring specifically to La Porta et al., Law & Finance, surpa, and commenting on the French 
government=s attention to the thesis).
34HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 32 at 54-70 (discussing the different conceptions of liberty and 
property inherent in the British versus French legal systems); HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, supra note 32.  See also 
Beck, et al., Endowments, supra note 32 at 138-39 (discussing the law and finance theory), and La Porta, et al., Law 
& Finance, supra note 7 at 1149-50 (concluding that French law is Ainvestor-unfriendly@).
Draft 031605
13
grounded in history.  The more traditional presentation asserts that the French Napoleonic Code=s 
breathtaking detail was designed to remove all discretion from a judiciary that had been 
notoriously obstreperous.35  The judges had manifested their anti-free market tendencies notably 
in the context of real property, where they strove to sustain the aristocrats= feudal rights against 
the king.36  As much as these anti-market tendencies may have inconvenienced the king, they 
also thwarted the future revolutionaries= belief in a natural-law right to property.37
The consequence of the Napoleonic response is that the Code empowers the executive 
over the judiciary and creates an environment more dirigiste than free market, arguably resulting 
in inefficiencies.38  In addition, the business laws of French-legal system countries appear on 
their face to be less protective of both shareholders= rights as against managers, and creditors=
35John Henry Merryman, The French Deviation, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 109, 109-11 (1996) (discussing the 
pre-revolutionary French judiciary=s alignment with the aristocracy against the monarchy, the post-revolutionary 
dictatorship=s desire to have the executive dominate, and the resultant stripping of legislative and interpretative 
authority from judges); RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, HANS W. BAADE, PETER E. HERZOG & EDWARD M. WISE, 
COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-MATERIALS 235-36 n.1 (6th ed. 1998) (discussing abuse by 18th century 
parlements and the resultant suspicion of Ajudicial legislation@, leading to a weakened post-revolutionary judiciary); 
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, DAVID S. CLARK & JOHN O. HALEY, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE LATIN AMERICA 
AND EAST AISA 439-40 (1994) (noting the Napoleonic dictatorship=s mistrust of judges because of their pre-
revolutionary opposition to authority).  See also JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN,, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION; AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 15 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the 
pre-Revolutionary judges= corruption).
Note that the Napoleonic Code is neither the summa of codes, nor the last word in French law.  The German 
Code of 1896 was more detailed and yet more comprehensive.  See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, et al., supra, at 236-38, 248 
(describing the detailed and comprehensive nature of the German Code).  The modern trend in French law to replace 
the Code by specific statutory pronouncements.  See, e.g., John Henry Merryman, How Others Do It: The French 
and German Judiciaries, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1865, 1868-70 (1988) (describing decodification through statutes, such 
as labor law statutes, and the increase in administrative procedures).
36See MERRYMAN, INTRODUCTION, supra note 35 at 15 (discussing the judges= support of the feudal 
system).
37Id. at 16 (discussing the revolutionaries= belief in natural rights to property).
38Beck et al., Endowments, supra note32 at 139; Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic 
Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 505 (2001) (referring to indications that, as a whole, civil 
law countries have developed less well than common law countries).
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rights as against debtors, than are their common-law analogues.39  This suggests that the French 
structure is less protective of property rights.  Conceivably, even in such a situation a well-
developed legal profession could create a space for a protection of property rights specifically 
through contractual provisions, and for protection against abuse of power by the executive 
through use of all remedial tools.40   While many factors have contributed to France=s economic 
success,41 one difference between the legal structure of France and that of developing countries 
with a French-based legal system is the that the presence of many more lawyers per capita in 
France may mean that the legal forms are used more flexibly in France.42  I am showing a 
correlation rather than claiming causation, but whatever protection lawyers can offer would be 
far less available in developing countries where, among other differences, the lawyer-per-capita 
ratio is far lower.43  The hypothesis is that developing countries= legal infrastructure, possessing 
39See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 7 at 1129, 1132, 1138 (comparing rights of shareholders 
and creditors under the French legal system with those under the common law system).
40For example, a remedial tool that helps protect some shareholder rights are preemptive rights, more fully 
discussed infra at notes 121-23. See La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1132 (discussing preemptive 
rights as a remedial measure for the protection of shareholders).  As against the government, a critical effort would 
be to avoid expropriation without adequate compensation, i.e., corruption.
41La Porta, et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1142 (France=s per capita GNP is 91% of the US=s).  
During a 3-decade period from the end of WWII through 1975, French governmental intervention in the economy let 
to a growth rate greater than that of the US.  See JAMES CORBETT, THROUGH FRENCH WINDOWS 301 (1975); Perry E. 
Wallace, The Globalization of Corporate Governance: Shareholder Protection, Hostile Takeovers and the Evolving 
Corporate Environment in France, 18 CONN. J. INT=L L. 1 (2002) (describing the ATrente Glorieuses@).
42See Ray August, Mythical Kingdom of Lawyers: America Doesn=t have 70% of the Earth=s Lawyers, 78 
ABA JOURNAL 72-74 (September 1992), available at http://august1.com/pubs/articles/lawyers.htm (last visited Aug. 
4, 2004) (France has more than 1-1/2 times the number of lawyers per capita as does the US).
43Alain Agboton, Senegal - Justice, Fiction and Reality, http://www.peacelink.it/anb-bia/nr337/e19.html 
(downloaded Oct. 15, 2003) (reporting that in 1998, there were in Senegal 270 practicing lawyers, 30 in training; 
240 in Dakar where 90% commerce).  In July 2004, Senegal=s population was approximately 10.9 million people.  
CIA, Senegal, WORLD FACTBOOK, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sg.html#People 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2004).  These figures, suggest 1:39,000 lawyers for Senegal (although the ration may be a bit 
less high since Senegal=s population has increased since 1998).  Another study suggests that the ratio in Senegal may 
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few lawyers to wring maximum protection from it, while maintaining the relatively weak 
judiciary inherited from the French legal system, simply cannot challenge the executive=s 
interference in the markets.44
Another difference between the France=s legal system and that of developing countries 
may be that the latter are adopting France=s rhetoric, but not its reality.  In France, despite all the 
talk about Napoleonic transfer of power from the judiciary to the executive, in fact the French 
judiciary is as strong as it needs to be to do its job.  In France, the judiciary does make law,
however much it claims only to interpret the codes and statutes.45
Ultimately, however, complaining about the inadequacy of the French system as applied 
in developing countries is relevant to OHADA=s choice of French law only if another system is 
more successful within the developing world.  The traditional law and finance argument reports 
that, unlike the French system, the common-law system evolved not to protect the State from the 
judiciary, but to protect private property from the State.46  To the extent that the state is excluded, 
be higher: 2.67 per 10,000, at least in the 1980s.  See August, supra note 42.  The same study reports that the Côte 
d=Ivoire boasted 8.98 lawyers per 10,000 people during the 1980s (long before the current civil war), while the 
United States sported 28.45 per 10,000, and France a whopping 46.34 per 10,000.  See supra August.  Other rough 
numbers offered for the United States suggest 37.74 lawyers per 10,000 in 2000.  See Frederick L. Trilling, The 
Strategic Application of Business Methods to the Practice of Law, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 13, 17 (1998) (projecting the 
ratio of lawyers to population of the United States to be at 1:265 in 2000).   See also Marc Galanter, News from 
Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 77, 77-83 (1993) (emphasizing how difficult it 
is to measure the number of lawyers for comparative purposes).
44See La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1139-40 (arguing that stricter enforcement may be a 
way of remedying the inherently less investor-friendly aspects of French law).
45See, e.g., Merryman, Deviation, supra note 35 at 116 (asserting that the French legal system has failed 
when Aexported@ to developing countries because the recipient communities adopt the weak judiciary, but do not 
include the sub rosa judicial law-making).  See also André Tunc, Methodology of the civil Law in France, 50 
TULANE L. REV. 459, 464-66, 470-73 (1976) (discussing French judges= use of prior case law and of academic 
scholarship to support their decisions modernizing the law, including extending the law of liability to damages and 
injury caused by inanimate objects).
46See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 38 at 508-11 (describing legal history: pro-property for British common 
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market forces tend to dominate.
The newer flavor of law and finance theory continues this comparative argument, but uses 
a statistical analysis of certain characteristics of various legal systems.  For example, after 
comparing the French-origin legal system with the common-law regime, and with German and 
Scandinavian civil-law regimes, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer 
and Robert W. Vishny (ALLSV@) conclude that the French-origin legal systems provide the 
weakest protection for creditors and shareholders, both by the laws= terms and by the level of 
enforcement.47  For their analysis, the authors focus exclusively on the laws of business 
organizations and of bankruptcy-reorganization.48  LLSV do concede that investors may be better 
protected than French laws on their face suggest, since ownership in French-system countries 
tends to be concentrated.  This high ownership-concentration may represent business people=s 
response to a perceived deficiency in the laws, as the owners can then use the power accorded by 
their relatively high ownership participation to protect their own interests.49  Corporations in 
West Africa=s developing markets may already benefit from this practical protection: the region=s 
law; anti-judiciary for French post-Revolutionary law); but see Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 9 at 27 
(asserting that corporate law changes in the United States were effected not by the common law=s evolution, but by 
statute).  See also La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1129, 1138-39 (common law countries on average 
offer better protection to shareholders and creditors than do countries whose law is based on French law, although 
the US is only weakly protective of creditors).
47La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1116, 1129-32, 1136-39, 1141 (discussing different 
regimes= relative protection of shareholders and creditors, including enforcement).
48Id. at 1120.
49Id. at 1148 (referring to a concentration of ownership as potentially an Aadaptation@).  This suggests that 
the authors consider ownership concentration to have appeared after the Napoleonic codes restricted judicial 
authority.  That is a reasonable assumption for our purposes, given that the first Napoleonic codes were adopted in 
1804, and it was not until 1867 that French corporations could be formed without governmental approval, meaning 
that corporations became Aoff-the-rack@ organizations, subject to standard terms.  See id. at 5-6 (noting that French 
corporations required express governmental approval before 1867).
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public markets are few and very small compared to developed countries, and ownership 
concentrations thus are relatively high.50
While these new law and finance authors do conclude that the French system is less 
protective of investor property than is the common-law system, they hesitate on the brink of 
claiming a true causal relationship between the French legal system and economic failure, and 
between the common law and economic success.51  Common-law countries include the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Australia, but they also include Zimbabwe.  The French-origin 
countries listed include Indonesia, but also Belgium and FranceBthe latter two being, as the 
authors expressly note, Avery rich countries.@52
There is strong evidence of a correlation between property protection, financial 
development and growth,53 but it was only the traditional law and finance theorists who 
maintained that the common-law system, being directly focused on protecting property, is 
inherently better-suited to supporting capitalist impulses even in developing countries.
50See, e.g., infra Part II.A.2.b (discussing the limited public ownership of corporations in West Africa).
51Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of 
External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1146 (1997) (the authors do find a relationship between legal origin and the 
Abreadth of their capital markets@).
52See La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1151-52 (asserting that the French-civil-law family 
offers the least protection for investors, resulting in higher concentrations of ownership and less liquid markets, but 
also noting that France and Belgium Aare both very rich countries@).  This argument is a neat segue to the next 
section, since it focuses on the historical influence, but also makes claims about the survival of social institutions.  La 
Porta et al. do emphasize the contextual nature of the investor-protections they study, although they do not argue that 
the differences in the laws are geared to make outcomes identical.   Id. at 1132.  See also Daniel Berkowitz, 
Katharina Pistor & Jean-François Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 185-86 (2003) (asserting 
that how legal institutions are transplanted is important, too: involuntary receipt is more negatively correlated with 
GDP than is the identity of the particular legal family implanted, although French law is negatively correlated with 
GDP; the worst combination for development is a non-OECD country=s involuntary receipt of French law).
53Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Investor Protection 
and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN=L ECON. 3, 16 (2000) (referring to earlier studies evidencing the correlation).
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Explanation
2. Comparative s Not Based on the Legal System
Other recent comparative theories, too, seek to explain the failure of certain countries to 
develop, but operate by debunking the emphasis on legal systems.
(a) Open trade and free flow of capital.  In direct response to LLSV, Rajan and Zingales 
point out that in 1913 and 1929, civil-law countries were no less developed than were common-
law countries, and that civil-law countries= relative economic weakness is a post-World War II 
phenomenon.  Part of the reason, according to these authors, is that the civil law is more 
centralized and thus more easily co-opted.  However, the civil law, because of the centralization, 
 also more easily benefits from pro-development initiatives.  There may be more volatility in 
civil-law countries= rate of development than in that of common-law countries, which means that 
the civilian system tends to suffer more on the downside, but also experience a higher rate of 
improvement on the upside.54
Thus, Rajan and Zingales see the civil law versus common law debate as far more 
inconclusive than do LLSV.  Indeed, Rajan and Zingales assert that a free flow of goods, 
especially when coupled with a free flow of capital, is far more predictive of economic growth 
than is the country=s legal system.55  These factors open the country=s economy to global 
pressures and, therefore, especially when present in tandem, limit private interests= ability to 
54Rajan & Zingales, supra note 15 at 42-45 (discussing relative rates of improvement between investor 
protection and financial development, and between financial development and economic growth).
55This does not necessarily mean that a free flow of goods and capital is in each event the best outcome for 
a developing economy.  See supra note 16 (discussing Stiglitz=s and Chang=s views against full liberalization).  The 
point, here, is that the French system at least is no worse than the common-law system.
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control the political system to their own advantage.56  In other words, avoiding a French-based 
legal system will not necessarily have any pro-development benefit, but controlling private 
interests= ability to control the economic system will pay dividends.
For our purposes, we need not adopt Ragan and Zingales=s emphasis that freely flowing 
trade and capital is essential to economic development.  Other economists maintain that a focus 
on social as well as economic measures is critical to development.57  However, both ends of the 
spectrum anticipate the need for significant additional capital inflows,58 and to the extent that the 
capital inflow requires private ordering for the application of those funds, the local legal regime 
is implicated.  According to Ragan and Zingales, a French-based legal system will at least be no 
worse than a common-law system.
(b) Endowment theory.  The endowment theorists maintain that the environment that 
European settlers encountered, and not the legal systems they brought with them, determines 
whether a country is successful in the post-colonial period.  Again, the choice of legal system is 
trumped by other factors.
If the Europeans experienced significant disease and mortality, they tended to establish 
authoritarian, extractive institutions designed purely to derive maximum profits from the 
56Rajan & Zingales, supra note 15 at 36-39, 43 (discussing how global economic pressures resulting from 
the free flow of goods and capital limit private interests= ability to seize rents from the local economy).
57See, e.g., Ocampo, supra note 4 at 101 (calling for developing countries to assert broad goals such as 
Ahuman development,@ instead of focusing narrowly on purely economic measures).
58See id. at 100 (emphasizing the Alinkages between economic and social development@).  See e.g., Sachs et 
al., supra note 10 at 164 (describing the sources of funding for three countries to meet the Millennium Development 
Goals for three African countries, including identifying the domestic and external funding needs).
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colony.59  If the Europeans landed in an environment where they did not fall sick, they tended to 
settle permanently and to establish relatively democratic institutions.60  After independence, 
whatever institutions the European settlers had previously established, democratic or not,  
became part of the countries= post-colonial endowments.61  Compare the outcomes in North 
America, Australia, New Zealand with those in, for example, Cameroon, Côte d=Ivoire and 
Senegal: settler mortality in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries was much higher in the 
latter group, and its current per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is much lower.62
There is, indeed, evidence that institutions survived the transition to independence.63
Post-independence, new leaders willingly stepped into the existing authoritarian, extractive 
institutions.64  This is proof, the endowment theory asserts, that settler mortality is negatively 
correlated with development. 
In the process, the endowment theorists assert that the French legal system may not be 
59Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (Dec. 2001), Appendix Table A2 including first 
graph.  The authors do not dispute that countries having inherited the French legal system are, on the whole, less 
economically developed than countries having inherited a common law system.  However, the factor of French legal 
origin does not affect their results.  Id. At 1388.
60Id. at 1376 (institutions persist)
61See also Beck et al., supra note 32 at 11-13 (generally agreeing with the conclusions of Acemoglu et al., 
supra note 59).
62The settler mortality figures are based on number of deaths per annum, per A1,000 soldiers, where each 
death is replaced with a new soldier.@  Acemoglu et al., supra note 59 at 1382.  The range is not subtle: whereas the 
US, which is not the lowest of the group, shows 15 deaths, Senegal showed 164.66, and Côte d=Ivoire, 668.  Id.,
Appendix Table A2 at 1398 (the per capita GDP figures are from 1995).
63See, id. at 1736 (discussing, inter alia, Mobutu=s Zaire).  Zaire, renamed the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (ARDC@ in French) is slated to join OHADA shortly.  See www.ohada.com.
64See Acemoglu et al., supra note 59 at 1395 (confirming that extractive, authoritarian institutions, such as 
the colonial regime in Congo, did survive, but also cautioning that institutions are not the only determinant of future 
economic success).
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separately correlated with lack of development.65  Despite the fact that, on average, the common 
law countries= legal provisions protect investors better than do those of civil law countries, 
especially French civil law countries,66 the endowment theorists maintain that the slow 
development of countries with the French legal system relative to those with the common law 
system is merely an artifact of history.  The French legal system is correlated with slow 
development, but does not necessarily cause it.
3. Remedial Steps
What, then, can we learn for the future from this analysis?  The law and finance adherents 
at worst see a suspect correlation between a French legal system and failure of economic 
development.  For their part, even the advocates for free flow of goods and capital, and the 
endowment theorists have rejected a causal relationship between the French legal system and 
lack of economic development.  However, because proving the negative is impossible, a risk-
averse response will let stand the French system, but introduce changes to reduce the 
impediments to development that the free-flow advocates, and the law and finance theorists have 
identified.
With a nod to the law and finance theorists, laws designed to support development should 
introduce into a French-based system flexibility not dependent on the skill of lawyers, and 
65In the process, the endowment-theory researchers show that the French legal system may not be separately 
correlated with lack of development.  Compare id. at 1388 (asserting that French legal origin does not affect their 
results) with La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1151-52, and Berkowitz et al., supra note 52 at 185-86 
(acknowledging the correlation of French legal system to lack of development).
66La Porta, Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1139-40;  But there are other apparent anomalies, such as the 
suggestion that rich countries= laws are less friendly to investors than are the laws of less developed countries.  Id. at 
1139 (especially for creditors).
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provisions capable of sheltering commerce from extractive and authoritarian impulses.  
Recognizing that the free-flow advocates= critique emphasizes the political nature of decisions to 
erect barriers, the choice of internal legal system does not influence those decisions.  Political 
realities determine what linkages exist between economic and social development, and these can 
be implemented whether private ordering is under a French legal system or a common law one.  
Whatever its form, a transparent and predictable domestic legal system will not impede cross-
border free flows more than the political authorities permit.   
The prescription that the endowment theory identifies is even harder to discern with 
confidence because we cannot change the past.  However, efforts to reverse the 
counterproductive norms inherited from the colonial era would be pro-growth.   Thus, 
encouraging longer-term investment would be helpful, as would other measures to reduce the 
elites= extractive impulses.  Adding protection of property, and specifically of investments, would 
be favorable, too.67  Once again, the type of pre-existing legal system does not determine the 
jurisdiction=s ability to develop economically.
II. OHADA LAWS: DESIGN, CONTENT AND STRUCTURE, AND ENFORCEMENT
With these tasks in mind, we turn to OHADA, remembering that the OHADA founders=
articulated goal is to facilitate foreign investment for the purpose of enhancing local 
development.68  OHADA laws are based on the French legal system.69  The last Part confirmed 
67See, e.g., Sachs, et al., supra note 10 at 164, and Stein, supra note 13 at 154-155 (acknowledging the 
importance of investment to growth).
68See supra note 6 (referring to President Kéba Mbaye and discussing OHADA=s avowed purpose of 
increasing foreign investment).
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that the civil law system in general, and the French legal system in particular, can be compatible 
with economic development.  By analyzing specific provisions of the OHADA laws, we will see 
that OHADA=s member-states have created a system of business laws uniquely designed to 
enhance regional economic development.
Together, the comparative and development-economics lenses indicate the structures that 
the OHADA legal regime must seek to provide if it is to enhance economic development.  First, 
OHADA must counter the authoritarian state, the rigid legal system, and the anti-private 
property, extractive structures.70  That is the negative conclusion suggested by the comparative 
analysis.  Second, it must affirmatively provide a structure, in this case a legal structure, that 
encourages investment, both domestic and foreign.  This kind of structure is likely designed to 
increase exports and lead to economic development.  OHADA emphatically does not, however, 
take a stand on the macroeconomic, political questions concerning, for example, the advisability 
of the neoliberal vision of free trade as the source of economic growth.  The OHADA laws focus 
only on enhancing the predictability of business transactions, not on macroeconomic, political 
decisions regarding barriers to goods or capital.
To ascertain whether the OHADA laws are supple rather than rigid, and whether they do 
encourage investment, we will turn to its uniform act concerning corporations and other business 
69See, e.g., KONÉ, supra note 3 at 16 (noting OHADA=s similarlity to the French legal system).  With 
respect to the impact of transplanting, and thus the importance of studying a transplant in context, see generally Alan 
Watson, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 335, 339-40, 346-51 (1996) (discussing transplants); see 
also Gunter Teubner, Legal Irritants; Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Divergences, 61 MODERN L. REV. 11, 14-32 (1998) (suggesting that a reception of law is more as an irritant than a 
transplant).
70See Beck et al., supra note 32 (without stipulating how to implement the recommendation, suggesting that 
a country would improve its chances of developing economically if it were to Areform its approach to property rights, 
private contracting, and free financial markets@).
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organizations.  This is only one of many,71 but it is a reasonable stand-in for the others: the way it 
addresses issues of corporate governance reflects assumptions about investment and, specifically, 
about what categories of investors are to be encouraged.  Within that statute, we will focus on the 
 most formal type of business association, the société anonyme, because less formal organizations 
offer fewer corporate-law points of comparison.72  After that analysis, we will turn to concerns 
about enforcement.
A. OHADA CORPORATE LAW
Our review of the comparative law theories and of development economics indicated that 
any corrective measure will have to protect private property and encourage capital formation in 
the context of whatever economic regime the body politic adopts.  Private ordering must be as 
reliable as possible within the shadow of whatever political regime exists.  Consider the 
71In addition to Acte Uniforme relatif au Droit des Sociétés Commerciales et du Groupment d=Intérêt 
Economique, adopted April 17, 1997, 2 JO OHADA 1 (October 1, 1997) (Acorporate code@), the current OHADA 
uniform acts are: Acte Uniforme relatif au Droit Commercial Général, adopted April 17, 1997, 1 Journal Officiel 
(JO) OHADA 1 (October 1, 1997); Acte Uniforme portant Organisation des Sûretés, adopted October 1, 1997 [April 
17, 1997], 3 JO OHADA 1 (October 1, 1997 [July 1, 1998]); Acte Uniforme, portant Organisation des Procédures 
Simplifées de Recouvrement et des Voies d=Exécution, adopted April 10, 1998, 6 JO OHADA 1 (July [June] 1, 
1998); Acte Uniforme, portant Organisation des Procédures Collectives d=Apurement du Passif, adopted April 10, 
1998, 7 JO OHADA 1 (July 1, 1998); Acte Uniforme relatif au Droit de l=Arbitrage, adopted March 11, 1999, 8 JO 
OHADA 2 (May 15, 1999); Acte Uniforme portant Organisation et Harmonisation des Compatibilités des 
Entreprises, adopted February 22, 2000 [March 24, 2000], 10 JO OHADA 1 (Nov. 20, 2000). See 
http://www.ohada.com/textes.php?PHPSESSID=f4b08a0fc3b774fad066419a02e2466a (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).  
Also extant is Act uniforme relatif aux Contrats de Transport de Marchandises par Route, adopted March 22, 2003, 
13 JO OHADA 3 (July 31, 2003). OHADA:TRAITE ET ACTES UNIFORMES COMMENTES ET ANNOTES, Joseph Issa-
Sazegh, Paul-Gérard Pougoué / Filiga Michel Sawdogo, ed. (2d ed. 2000) (with 2003 addendum).
72However, the most popular business form varies, as a practical matter, within the region.  The 
Groupement d=Intérêt Economique (GIE), partly for historical reasons, is favored in Senegal.  Interviews with QN, 
Dakar, June 24, 2004; Me.TT, Dakar, June 24, 2004 (notes on file with author).  In the Côte d=Ivoire, the most 
favored form is the Société à Responsabilité Limitée (SARL), and the GIE is limited to agricultural cooperatives as 
was apparently originally intended. Interviews with TE, DL, QF, Abidjan, June 28, 2004; see also Interview with 
Me. HT, Abidjan, June 28, 2004.  The SARL is also the most common form in Cameroon.  Interview with Me. BK, 
Douala, July 5, 2004.  This nation-to-nation inconsistency is problematic in the face of OHADA=s drive to 
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investor=s non-market risks when investing in a corporation, whether public or private, and 
whether the investor is foreign or domestic.  First, there is the Berle and Means problem, the 
agency costs that, according to Northern scholars, occur as soon as ownership is separated from 
management.73  Second, there is the problem of conflicts among shareholders.74
OHADA corporate law addresses these issues on two levels.  Its conception of corporate 
social responsibility incorporates the behavior that its community expects of corporations.75
Corporate governance, the topic that has received a great deal of attention in recent years both in 
the United States and in Europe, is essentially the implementation of the applicable principles of 
uniformity.  See infra part II.B.
73ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6-7 
(1932) (discussing the importance of the separation of ownership from management).  There is an argument that 
French corporations are pre-Berle and Means because the French constitution stipulates that the state is to favor the 
national community over private property, at least to the extent that both shareholders and managers are French.  
However, as a practical matter, individual managers, even if French,  will continue to have incentives to shirk and 
otherwise steal.  See Benjamin Mojuyé, French Corporate Governance in the New Millenium [sic]: Who Watches 
the Board in Corporate France?, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 73, 77-78, 110-111 (2000); see generally, Dickerson, 
Ozymandias, supra note 29 160 n.143 (2003) (same).
74For simplicity, the discussion will focus only on the société anonyme (SA), which is the classic 
corporation.  However, the OHADA statute offers a series of choices, including the société à responsabilité limitée
(SARL), which is part of the inspiration for the limited liability companies now authorized by state laws in the 
United States.  See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Susan Pace Hamill, Michael L. Gravelle & Sharon Connaughton, The 
Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 BUS. LAW. 375, 378 (1992) (noting the similarity 
between limited liability companies and several European and Latin American analogies to the SARL); William 
Callison, Venture Capital and Corporate Governance: Evolving the Limited Liability Company to Finance the 
Entrepreneurial Business, 26 J. CORP. L. 97, 119 (2000) (mentioning specifically the SARL)    I am focusing on the 
SA because that allows me to discuss the publicly held business forms, but I recognize that non-corporate forms, 
including the SARL are particularly well-suited to capital formation by indigenous entrepreneurs.
Outside the realm of corporate law, the investor is subject to other non-market risks, including an opposing 
party=s refusal to pay.  While OHADA laws cover this issue to some degree, it is not in addressed in the uniform act 
on corporations and other business organizations, but instead, in the act on recovery of debts.  See supra note 71 
(listing the OHADA uniform acts).
75See, e.g., Dickerson, Ozymandias, supra note 29 at 1052-60 (2003) (describing post-scandal reform 
efforts in the US (post-Enron), the UK (post-Maxwell and post-Marconi), and in France (post-Marseille soccer club 
and post-Alcatel Alsthorn)).
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corporate social responsibility.76  Thus, before delving into OHADA=s structure of corporate 
governance, we must consider its conception of corporate social responsibility.  Because it 
provides an uncompromising perspective, the United States provides the point of comparison.
1. Corporate Social Responsibility
In the United States, the classic articulation of corporate social responsibility belongs to 
the Chicago-school, Nobel-winning economist, Milton Friedman.  In 1970, he asserted that the 
corporation=s social responsibility is to generate maximum profits legally possible for its 
shareholders.77  To seek to do anything else amounts to taxation of the shareholders by corporate 
management.  Sometimes the effect is taxation of employees through depressed wages, or of 
consumers through increased prices.  Friedman asserts that managers should not spend corporate 
property to accomplish what they perceive to be a social good.  If they persist, they  are 
misapplying assets in order to achieve what the body politic demonstrably refused to do.78
Friedman=s claim that corporate management must focus on maximizing value for its 
shareholders is completely consistent with the dominant view in the United States today: it 
reflects recognition of Ashareholder primacy.@  Students of US corporation law may object that 
76See Jennifer Cook & Simon Deakin, Stakeholding and Corporate Governance: Theory and Evidence on 
Economic Performance (July 1999) at 2, available at www. dti.gov.uk/cld/ersc1.pdf (last visited mar. 30, 2004).
77Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, 
September 13, 1970 at 32 (Friedman speaks of profits, not shareholder value).  Assuming that the securities markets 
are informationally efficient, value and profit reduce to the same concept.  ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE 
LAW 18 (1986).  Another characterization is Ashareholder wealth maximization.@ See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (citing 
to Milton Friedman and referring to wealth maximization).
78Friedman, supra note 77 at 33, 121-22, 124.
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there are many other schools of thought even in the United States concerning corporate social 
responsibility, including the Progressives who have espoused a stakeholder concept.79  My point 
is only that, to the extent that these alternative schools stray from the shareholder primacy model, 
they are normative; as a purely descriptive matter the legal system in the United States is deeply 
committed to shareholder primacy.80  Subject to some management discretion, the corporation is 
supposed to generate maximum value for shareholders.  That is the corporation=s social 
responsibility.81
The shareholder primacy model certainly can help preserve the property that the owners 
invest in corporations.  It clarifies expectations by articulating that corporations should not 
perform governmental functions.  Of course, there is something circular about describing what 
corporations should do, and then asserting that anything else is a forbidden, governmental action.
79PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).  Some might include the Team 
Production Model as a variant of progressive corporate law, but it is about board supremacy as arbiter, and does not 
predict how the directors would arbitrate.  David Millon, New Game Plan or Business As Usual?, A Critique of the 
Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001 (2000).  Thus, the Team Production Model is more 
about corporate governance than corporate social responsibility.
80For example, when the media recently discussed Wal-Mart=s apparent abuse of undocumented workers, 
the criticism was not articulated in terms of the corporation=s social responsibility to its stakeholder-employees.  
Instead, the media focused on the fact that Wal-Mart=s violation of immigration laws by hiring undocumented 
workers facilitated Wal-Mart=s further violation of labor and safety laws.  That=s not a discussion of corporate social 
responsibility that would assert, for example, a corporation=s duty, in its capacity as a corporation, to treat its workers 
fairly (except, of course, to the extent that Wal-Mart=s search for profits even through illegal means would be 
inconsistent with its responsibility to shareholders).  Greg Schneider, Longtime Price Message Takes Back Seat to 
Blitz Designed to Mend Reputation, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2004) at E01; available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A43156- 2004Jan23?language=printer (downloaded Mar. 4, 2004)
81In practice, the business judgment rule leaves directors a wide margin of acceptable behaviors, unless the 
duty of loyalty is at issue, as in the case of hostile takeovers (Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Co., 493 A.2d 946 
(Del. S. Ct. 1985)) and, especially, a board decision to sell the company (Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. S. Ct. 1985)).  The trends in the United Kingdom may be toward a middle course 
between the U.S. perspective and the more stakeholder, French version described below.  See Cynthia A. Williams & 
John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way?: The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 
CORNELL J. INT=L L. ___ (forthcoming 2005) (arguing that the U.K. has moved to a middle ground between the U.S. 
and the Continent); see also Dickerson, Ozymandias, supra note 29 at 1055-58 (describing UK efforts at corporate-
governance reform during the 1990s).
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As distinguished from the concept of shareholder primacy familiar to US lawyers and 
increasingly to UK lawyers,82 France has adopted the concept of Aintérêt social@, or Acorporate 
interest.@  Although a minority view asserts that this Acorporate interest@ is nothing more than the 
individual and common interest of the owners, the majority view is expansive.  With respect to 
acts affecting the corporation=s assets, this understanding of Acorporate interest@ at minimum 
includes not only the owners, but also the interest of the corporation as a whole, which in its turn 
includes even third parties that have contracted with the corporation.  The expansive 
understanding of Acorporate interest@ may require management to consider, in addition to the 
owners, the interests of employees, creditors, suppliers, clients, and perhaps even the State.83
The majority position has a tone that certainly is far more stakeholder than shareholder primacy.
The concept of Acorporate interest@ was already deeply embedded in the French corporate 
law that preceded OHADA in most of the OHADA territory,84 and even at this early stage of the 
OHADA regime=s existence, OHADA appears to have adopted the stakeholder sense of 
Acorporate interest.@85  However, OHADA has not yet generated enough jurisprudence to reveal 
82See, e.g., Cook & Deakin, supra note 76 at 3 (discussing managers= responsibility to shareholders of UK 
corporations).
83See KONÉ, supra note 3 at 157-58 (discussing the three theories of intérêt social under French corporate 
law).  With respect to shareholders= voting rights, the application of intérêt social may be more restrained, with the 
principle of equality of shares trumping.  Even there, however, judges consider both the interest of the other 
shareholders, and the interest of the corporation as a whole.  Id. at 158.
84See id. at 156 (discussing the state of the law in the OHADA territory starting in 1935). 
85See id. at 157-59 (suggesting that the concept of intérêt social may have become the Acompass@ for the 
corporate operation in France, and that, although this is not yet certain, the OHADA regime may well share that 
sensibility).   See also FRANÇOIS ANOUKAHA, ABDOULLAH CISSE, NDIAW DIOUF, JOSETTE NGUEBOU TOUKAM, 
PAUL-GÉRARD POUGOUE & MOUSSA SAMB, OHADA: SOCIÉTÉS COMMERCIALES ET G.I.E. 269 (2002) (hereinafter 
SOCCOM) (discussing intérêt social in the context of abus de biens, and noting the French jurisprudence calling for 
protection of third parties, as well as the owners and the Apatrimoine@ (Apatrimony@) of the corporation).
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whether Acorporate interest@ will ultimately embrace the full panoply of interested parties, 
including the State.  If it does so, the OHADA norm of corporate social responsibility would 
presumably forbid environmental discrimination,86 and might well include affirmative 
obligations to provide various services to those whom its operations affect.  In any event, its 
umbrella covers employees, many of whom will presumably be members of the local community. 
 Given OHADA=s purpose of promoting foreign investment in order to enhance the region=s 
economic development, OHADA would be consistent with that goal if it were ultimately to adopt 
a version of Acorporate interest@ that balances the perceived needs of potential investors with 
those of the host region.  The flexibility of the concept allows it to adjust its contours so as to be 
consistent with the region=s evolving political assumptions concerning the best route to economic 
growth.
The OHADA corporate law=s retention of the norm of Acorporate interest@ thus is our first 
indication of the balance that the OHADA legislators sought.  Specifically, they opted for a 
concept responsive to local expectations, but one that already includes some guidelines.  A 
foreign investor might prefer shareholder primacy, depending on applicable factors; however, the 
local government that includes not only elites that might invest, but also voters who may be 
employees of the enterprise, might well prefer the stakeholder approach.87  The concept of 
86See, e.g., Edward Patrick Boyle, Note, It=s Not Easy Bein= Green: The Psychology of Racism, 
Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV.
937, 968 (1993) (succinctly describing the phenomenon, in the United States, of environmental discrimination).
87The stakeholder norm may also be better suited to the host country=s cultural norms.  That is another 
study, but to the extent that regional norms in Africa support more community-based expectations than does the 
United states= more individualistic approach, the Acorporate interest@ assumption may well better answer local needs 
for that reason, too.  See, e.g., MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC 
SOCIETIES 3-5 (1925; translated by Ian Cunnison 1967) (emphasizing the importance of groups in Aprimitive@
societies, specifically relating to Aarchaic contracts@).  But see KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE 
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Acorporate interest,@ the focus on the highest interest of the corporation, may in addition 
implicitly demand that a dominant shareholder not oppress the minority.  In other words, this 
concept describes an equitable perspective directly applicable to classic corporate governance.88
How, then, does OHADA translate its stakeholder understanding of corporate social 
responsibility into action?  How would a corporate-interest conception of corporate social 
responsibility differ from a shareholder-primacy conception when seeking to protect private 
property and, more generally, to encourage investment?  Depending on local expectations, either 
formula, can meet them.  An indigenously grown conception of corporate social responsibility 
will, by definition, conform to that society=s norms.  Drawing with a broad brush, we can say that 
the stockholder-primacy theme better suits the United States culture because it is consistent with 
our admiration for rugged individualism.89  When transplanting a system, it is of course much 
more difficult to determine whether corporate interest or shareholder primacy would be best 
suited to, for example, the OHADA region.90  Anthropologists have disagreed on how to 
CHEYENNE WAY, CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 50-51 (1941) (pointing out that modern 
society, like primitive ones, operates through groups).
88Interview with Me. FB, Douala, Cameroon, July 5, 2004 (discussing Aintérêt social@).
89ROBERT N. BELLAH, RICHARD MADSEN, WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANN SWIDLER & STEVEN M..TIPTON, 
HABITS OF THE HEART 27-51 (1985) (considering a sociological perspective of individualism); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, 
BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (discussing the disintegration of 
community life in the United States).
90See, e.g., Watson, Teubner, supra note 69 (discussing, respectively, Atransplants@ and Airritants@).  See 
also, Katharina Pistor & Daniel Berkowitz, Of Legal Transplants, Legal Irritants, and Economic Development, in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (P. K. Cornelius & B. Kogut, ed.) (2003) 
347, 348-53, 361-62 (discussing irritants in the context of transplants into the developing world); Máximo Langer, 
From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization 
Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT=L L.J. 1, 29-35 (2004) (arguing that Atranslation@ is a better metaphor 
than Atransplants@ or Airritants@).
Draft 031605
31
understand another culture=s legal norms.91  Nevertheless, I will hazard a fundamental 
generalization for the purpose of discussion.
A formulation of corporate social responsibility that champions owners above all other 
constituencies rather than valuing the entire community, may be more instinctive in a Western 
culture than in an emerging economy still influenced by Aprimordial attachments@ and Aquasi-
kinship@ obligations.92  I do not mean to overstate this generalization, either.93  Among other 
complexities exists not only the reality of different attitudes within the developing world, but 
also the fact that some Western countries are more community-minded than others.94  Although 
OHADA-region scholars and practitioners well-versed in business law are keenly aware of the 
corporate interest norm embedded in the OHADA corporate law, they have mixed views 
regarding Acorporate interest.@  They do not reject the principle; they only question its 
relevance.95  For example, no one I interviewed said the stakeholder approach was culturally 
91Compare Max Gluckman, Concepts in the Study of Tribal Law, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 349-55, 
371-73 ((Laura Nader ed. 1969; 1997) (comparing Bohannan=s use of local terms unfavorably to his own use of 
Western analogues, while admiring Bohannan=s descriptive skill) with  Paul Bohannan, Ethnography and 
Comparison in Legal Anthropology, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 401-18 (Laura Nader ed. 1969; 1997) 
(complaining of Gluckman=s use of Western terms).
92Clifford Geertz, The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States, 
in OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES: THE QUEST FOR MODERNITY IN ASIA AND AFRICA (Clifford Geertz, ed. 1963) at 
109, 112.
93For an indication of the complexity, see Keith Hart, The Social Anthropology of West Africa, 14 ANN. 
REV. ANTHROPOL. 243 (1985) (reviewing studies of the region and noting the disjuncture caused by colonialism and 
independence).
94See, e.g., MAUSS, supra note 87 at 65 (describing the rise of collectivism in France during the 20th century 
inter bellum).
95See supra text accompanying notes 82-88 (discussing Aintérêt social@ under French law, and considering 
its status under OHADA law). See also Interview with Me. FB, supra note 88 (rejecting relevance of Acorporate 
interest@).  However, I also visited a company in Buéa, Cameroon operated in a manner consistent with the highest 
level of corporate interest.  Academics displayed mixed reactions.  Compare Interview on June 30, 2004 with Prof. 
Anne-Marie Assi-Esso, founder of a law school in Abidjan, Côte d=Ivoire, the Ecole Supérieure Internationale de 
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inappropriate.  Instead, for the practical-minded, clarity of terms and predictability of judgment-
execution are more urgent issues.96  The dispute between the two principles was in effect 
dismissed by many as luxury in which only developed economies can indulge.
One academic, however, actually embraced the concept of corporate interest, stating 
explicitly that it can help prevent abuse.97  Because the principle of corporate interest is broad 
enough to conform to many cultures, it will be interesting to see how it evolves in the OHADA 
region;98 as we shall see, the OHADA laws are adopted by a process that includes local input.99
At minimum, Acorporate interest@ is a concept that, in France, has been compatible with 
economic success,100 and that should be flexible enough to support many perspectives, not just 
the classic, neoliberal view.  Thus, it is at worst neutral, and may be favorable to economic
growth, especially if the political interests do call for linking investment to social as well as 
Droit (rejecting Acorporate interest@ as irrelevant to the business realities in the region) with Interview with Vice 
Rector and Prof. Paul-Gérard Pougoué, Soa, Cameroon, July 9, 2004 (suggesting that the principle of Acorporate 
interest@ can serve as a means of avoiding abuse).
96Interview with Me. FB supra note 88 (rejecting relevance of Acorporate interest@); Interview with Prof. 
Assi-Esso, supra note 95 (rejecting Acorporate interest@ as irrelevant to the business realities in the region).
97Interview with Prof. Pougoué, supra note 95 (suggesting that the principle of Acorporate interest@ can 
serve as a means of avoiding abuse; Prof. Pougoué did not describe the type of abuse that he believed could be 
attenuated but from the context, he may have been referring to managers= abuse of corporate power in their dealings 
with the corporations= various constituencies).
98The principle of Acorporate interest@ may create additional risks to a fragile judicial environment.  Because 
it is more of a standard than a rule, its application depends on judges= exercise of discretion.  To give judges 
discretion is to increase the risk of corruption.  See Interview with Prof. Pougoué, supra note 95 (noting that the 
danger of corporate interest is that it provides discretion to judges).
99See infra part II.B.1.c (discussing OHADA=s legislative branch, the Council of Ministers).
100See La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 7 at 1151-52 (describing France as a Avery rich 
countr[y]@).
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economic impacts.101
2. Corporate Governance
a.  Berle & Means: Separation of ownership and management.  In addition to standards 
such as the Acorporate interest@, the OHADA corporate statute also imposes many rules that limit 
management behavior.  Many of these rules will be utterly unsurprising to a common-law lawyer: 
management is not supposed to indulge in conflict transactions, so loans from the corporation 
are, for example, forbidden.102  And, importantly in the context of transparency, management is 
supposed to keep the shareholders informed.103  How the concept of corporate interest is 
implemented reveals whether OHADA is flexible and supports property rights against the state 
and extractive elites.104
To be sure, individual implementing provisions may be relatively unfamiliar to the 
Anglo-American lawyer.  Thus we must consider them in the context of the entire unfirom act 
concerning business organizations.  
Turning first to management=s obligation to inform the owners, OHADA law requires that 
any corporation  must have a statutory auditor.105  This is not a trivial protection: it was such an 
101See Ocampo, supra note 4 at 100-01 (with respect to developing countries, advocating linkages of 
economic and social development, and identifying Ahuman development@as a goal).
102SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 271 (concerning conflicts of interest generally), and 422 & 430 (noting that 
managers cannot borrow from the corporation, with very few exceptions).
103See generally SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 79-80, 462-63 (describing the shareholders= rights to receipt of 
information from managers).  Id. at 169 (noting that an S.A. must have a commissaire aux comptes).
104See supra Introduction to Part II.
105The reference, as usual in this discussion, is to an SA.  See SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 449 (noting also 
that even SARLs must appoint a statutory auditor if they exceed a specified fairly small size in annual sales of 250 
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auditor who first unmasked Messier=s excesses at Vivendi Universal.106  Twice a year, 
shareholders may also demand that management reveal any information that could have a 
significant, negative financial impact.107
While some of these provisions may seem needlessly formal, they may be particularly 
important in a developing economy.  Especially in the United States, the oft-repeated assertion is 
that, at least for public corporations, the markets place important constraints on managers.108
However, in economies that tend not to have widely dispersed share ownership and thus are not 
susceptible to hostile takeovers for example, some of the developed-country market constraints 
are not available as a practical matter.109  This formalism therefore should be reassuring to 
investors, both domestic and foreign, because it may enhance transparency and predictability in 
an environment where legal sophistication is relatively hard to come by.
million fr. CFA (164K i) or in number of employees employees (50)).
106See Dickerson, Ozymandias, supra note 29 at 1047 (discussing the Vivendi Universal melt-down and the 
role of the accounting firm, Salustro-Reydel); Ennuis Judiciaires en Vue pour les Deux Rivaux, LA TRIBUNE (Oct. 
30, 2002), available at 
http://www.latribune.fr/Dossiers/vivendi.nsf/(LookupPrint)/IDC1256B2E0034D352C1256C62007A99C5?OpenDoc
ument (downloaded Mar. 30, 2004) (identifying Salustro-Reydel as Vivendi=s Acommissaire aux comptes@ (statutory 
auditor) at the relevant time).
107See SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 449.
108For a summary of certain market restraints on managers of US public corporations, see, e.g., Manuel A. 
Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540, 554-56 (1995).
109See Ajit Singh, The New International Financial Architecture, Corporate Governance and Competition 
in Emerging Markets: Empirical Anomalies and Policy Issues in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (Ha-Joon 
Chang, ed. 2003) at 377, 391 (also noting that countries such as France have effectively constrained their managers 
by means other than hostile takeovers).  This last point is particularly interesting given that the OHADA legal regime 
is heavily based on French law.  The limitations on US-style market constraints exist, of course, whenever the 
markets are less liquid and diversified than in the US.  See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate 
Governance in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH (Klaus 
J. Hopt, Kideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy Wymeersch & Stefan Prigge eds. 1998) at 701, 716-17 (asserting that 
public disclosure is a more effective constraint on managers in the US, as opposed to Japan or Germany).
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In other ways, the OHADA statute has opted for simplicity rather than any other value.  
Reformers in France, and for that matter reformers in the United Kingdom and the United States 
with greater success, have called for Aindependent@ directors, that is, persons who have no 
substantial relationship with the corporation other than as director.110  The OHADA statute, on 
the other hand, seems to assume that it may be too difficult to find independent directors and 
that, in any event, even if a new broom sweeps clean, the old one knows all the corners.  There is 
some justification for OHADA=s agnosticism on the subject of independent directors, as several 
scholars have persuasively questioned their usefulness in enhancing a firm=s economic 
performance.111  OHADA=s response is both pragmatic and balanced: although OHADA-region 
directors must be non-conflicted, they need not be Aindependent.@
Reformers in the North have been very leery of allowing too much power to concentrate 
in the hands of a single manager or group of managers.112  Nevertheless, again presumably in the 
interest of simplicity, the OHADA statute does not provide for splitting the board into a 
110See, e.g., See Dickerson, Ozymandias, supra note 59 at 1052-60 (reporting that the UK=s reforms 
champion non-executive directors, and that the US and French reforms call for increased use of independent 
directors).  See also Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, supra note 9 at 28 (noting that developing countries are different, that 
French law requires contractual sophistication at least concerning organizational forms, and that, consequently, 
simplicity is better).
111See, e.g., Sanjai Baghat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation between Board Independence and Long-
Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002) (showing that in the US, independent directors have little 
effect); see also Julian Franks et al., Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?, ' 3.4 (Centre 
for Econ. Pol'y Research, Discussion Paper No. 2949, 2001) (discussing the importance of the endgame in the UK).
112See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, SEC to Approve Governance Rules by NYSE, Nasdaq, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 
2003) (reporting that the proposals to be voted on by the SEC require a majority of independent directors, and 
regular meetings of nonmanagement directors, for all corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange or 
Nasdaq).  UK: The Combined Code, Principles of Good Governance and of Best Practice, ' 1(A)(1-3) (2000) 
(mandating the board to be effective, separate chairman from CEO, and balance between NEDs and executive 
directors), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).   France: see 
Dickerson, Ozymandias, supra note 29 at 1059 (discussing the two-tier board option in France, and the Viénot 1999 
report=s suggestion that, if the Président and Directeur-Général positions are held by the same person, the board 
clearly articulate the extent of the powers of the APDG@).
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supervisory board and a management board.  It does not stipulate separation of the role of the 
Chairman of the Board from that of the chief executive officer (CEO).113  It even affirmatively 
requires that, if there are three or fewer shareholders, a single Administrator-General will serve 
as Chairman of the Board and CEO, and even as the board itself.114  The purpose for this last 
provision is to add flexibility to the standard corporate form, the société anonyme, in the interest 
of attracting foreign investment.115
b. Relationships between and among shareholders.  With respect to the relationship 
among shareholders, it is useful to remember that there are public shareholders in the OHADA 
territory.  The regional stock market, located in the Côte d=Ivoire, lists just under forty 
companies, and had a capitalization of US$1.3 billion in 2003.116  It is interesting, but probably 
not surprising, that the stock market is located in a country that has at least a small bourgeoisie.  
While most listed companies are majority-held by foreign investors, Ivorian shareholdings 
represent very close to half the capitalization.117  Although the market has not been a major 
source of capital for new ventures, it has been an important forum where foreign and domestic 
113See SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 425-29 (discussing the roles of the Président (Chairman), of the Directeur 
Général (CEO) and of the Président Directeur Général).
114See, id. at 429-31.
115Id. at 429.  The most used form is the SARL or the GIE, depending on the particular state-member of 
OHADA.  See also Interviews with QN, Me. TT, TE, DL, QF, Me. HT and Me. BK, supra note 72.
116With this market valuation, the entire market would be around number 450 on Fortune 500.  See 
http://www.fortune.com/fortune/fortune500/company/top500/0,17354,401,00.html (downloaded Oct 15, 2003). For a 
description of the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM), see 
http://www.mbendi.co.za/exch/25/p0005.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005). 
117See Kathryn C. Lavelle, Architecture of Equity Markets: The Abidjan Regional Bourse, 55 INT=L ORG.
717, 718, 728, 735 (2001) (reporting that non-West Africans Acontrol an overwhelming percentage of the publicly 
listed firms@; that the Côte d=Ivoire had developed a Asmall bourgeoisie@; and that AIvoriens [sic] hold 49.4 percent of 
total market capitalization@).  
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capital can meet.  The stock market appears to have been a vehicle through which governments 
have effected the privatization demanded by international financial institutions.118  Thus, while 
the stock market may have evolved because of the adherence of international financial 
institutions to neoliberal norms, it remains a structure that could play an important future role in 
generating both domestic and foreign capital.  OHADA=s legislators have taken this into account 
by providing a statute that applies both to public and to private companies.
The principal standard applicable to relations among shareholders under the OHADA 
corporate statute is a prohibition against abuse by either the majority or the minority.119  Given 
that foreigners tend to hold a majority of public companies, but that domestic shareholders 
already have significant holdings, this balance indicates that the OHADA project seeks to protect 
owners= investments, whether the investors are foreign or domestic, and whatever the level of 
their holdings.  Thus, OHADA encourages foreign investment while simultaneously sheltering 
domestic participation in capitalizing businesses.120
Along with applicable standards, there are many rules, of course.  Two that also reflect 
the balance the OHADA drafters have sought but that may surprise foreigners are preemptive 
rights and a double-vote provision.121  Preemptive rights are still popular in France;122 in contrast, 
118See, id. at 723, 730 (discussing developing countries= use of illiquid stock markets as a way to comply 
with the IFIs= demands for privatization).  The BRVM became truly regional in 1998, when the Senegalese company, 
Sonatel, was privatized.  See, id. at 734 (discussing Sonatel).
119See SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 77-78, 187 (discussing the principle of equality among shares, and the 
illegality of abuse, meaning essentially self-serving behavior, not justified by Al=intérêt de la société@, by either the 
majority or the minority).
120See supra this Part II.A.2.b.
121See SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 464 (preemptive rights) and 77, 460-61 (double vote).
122See Dickerson, Ozymandias, supra note 29 at 1044-45 (noting that preemptive rights are more common 
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they have for the most part disappeared from corporate practice in the United States, where they 
are seen as limiting management=s ability to raise capital, especially as shareholdings become 
more widely dispersed and the mechanics of exercising these rights thus more cumbersome.123
Basically, when preemptive rights exist, they allow shareholders to retain their existing 
percentage of ownership in the face of a new issuance of shares.  If the shareholder now holds 
twenty percent, it can buy up to twenty percent of the new issue at the issue price.  Given that 
foreign shareholders currently hold a majority position in most public companies and thus control 
them, the preemptive rights tend to protect the domestic minority shareholders.  The drafters 
must have assumed that companies would succeed in raising needed new capital, whether from 
the originally targeted sources, or from existing shareholders that exercise their preemptive 
rights. 
The drafters may also have considered that the minority (usually domestic) shareholders 
should at minimum be allowed to participate even if those shareholders typically do not possess 
enough capital to stay in for many rounds.  Further, the negative aspects of preemptive rights are 
far less salient where even public companies= shareholdings are not widely distributed.  Finally, 
the drafters doubtless realized that in closely held businesses, the majority holder could well be 
Ivoirian.  Thus, the OHADA states-members adopted a corporate law that offers a reasonable 
in France than in the US; indeed, Vivendi Universal had such a provision).
123See, e.g., Lori A. Dawkins, Note, Shareholders= Preemptive Rights in West Virginia, 97 W.VA. L. REV.
437, 439041 (1993).  The issue is the same today, as evidenced by events toward the end of Jean-Marie Messier=s 
tenure as PDG of Vivendi Universal.  He had requested that the shareholders approve a repeal of preemptive rights 
in order to simplify the company=s task of raising capital; the shareholders refused.  Richard Verrier, Michael A. 
Hiltzik, & Sallie Hofmeister, Messier Faces His Critics at Meeting; Media: Vivendi Universal Shareholders Veto a 
Stock-Otpion Plan for Management But OK Firing of Pierre Lescure, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2002) at C1, 2002 WL 
2471233.
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balance between foreign and domestic interests and a reasoned recognition of local realities.
As to the double-voting rights, OHADA corporate law provides that shareholders who 
have held shares for at least two years in their own names, not in bearer form, can be awarded 
double voting rights.124  As a point of comparison the average U.S. investor holds investments 
7.8 years.125  Like preemptive rights, double-voting rights are an artifact of French law.126  While 
it is not clear whether this provision benefits foreign investors or domestic ones, its retention 
serves to encourage early investment and to preserve the status quo.127  Thus, in the OHADA 
region, double voting rights seek to rectify an aspect of pre-OHADA law criticized by the 
comparative lens:128 they support stability and discourage a cut-and-run, extractive approach to 
investment.129
B. OHADA PRAGMATIC REACH: ENFORCEMENT
OHADA law may be balanced and sophisticated, and it may be particularly suited to 
124See, SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 77, 460-61 (discussing double vote, and the 2-year, nominal-holding 
requirement).
125Adam Ritt, Who Is the American Shareholder? Voice of the American Shareholder, BETTER INVESTING 
MAGAZINE, NAIC (January 2004), available at www.better-investingnewsroom.org/voice/Voic-164.htm (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2005) (reporting Harris Interactive poll results).
126See, e.g, L=Association Notariale de Paris 12, Le Gouvernement d=Entreprise, available at 
http://dessnotaire.free.fr/exposes/legouvernementdentreprise.htm (last visted Apr. 2, 2004) (referring to French law 
and plural voting rights).
127
*Le Gouvernement d=Entreprise, http://dessnotaire.free.fr/exposes/legouvernementdentreprise.htm 
(downloaded Oct 3, 2003) (suggests that pre-NRE, weighted voting is possible; less clear post-NRE; check L 225-
25).
128See, supra Part I.B (discussing the comparative lens).
129There are also provisions to protect bondholders and other creditors. See, SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 470-
479.
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encourage both foreign and domestic investment; however, it will not be effective unless it is 
enforced.  There are two aspects to this problem of enforcement.  The threshold assumption of 
OHADA=s founders is that a harmonized, modern system of business laws will enhance the 
territory=s economic development, in part by making the region attractive to foreign 
investment.130  For these purposes Aharmonization@ is no flimsy concept: the process creates truly 
uniform business laws throughout the OHADA territory.131  Even if there is enforceability, a 
variation from state to state will weaken the nations= ability to define their own norms, and to 
then impose them on foreign investors.  If each member state of OHADA can interpret the laws 
at the national level, the effort to attract foreign investment can become a race to the bottom.  For 
example, an OHADA member-state could choose to retreat from the balanced treatment 
described in the prior section and, instead, favor majority shareholders in the hopes of reassuring 
the foreigners.  Because OHADA laws are harmonized (uniform), they do not facilitate or 
otherwise encourage this kind of divisive behavior.132
From a different, more positive perspective, persons trading among or into OHADA 
130See, e.g., LeBoulanger, supra note 2: AL=objectif du Traité et des institutions qu=il a mises en place est, 
selon les auteurs, ambitieux: il s=agit, d=une part de promouvoir un droit des affaires moderne et unique, susceptible 
de mettre un terme à l=insécurité juridique résultant de la vétusté dans de nombreux pays et de la disparité des 
législations nationales en la matière, d=autre part de lutter contre l=insécurité judiciaire dont la cause essentielle réside 
dans le manque chronique de moyens des juridictions nationales, en créant un environnement favorable au 
développement des échanges commerciaux et des investissements.@ A professor at the Ivoirian University of 
Cocody=s law school, who also was serving as a deputy to the national assembly, commented favorably on that 
assumption.  See Lohoues-Oble, supra note 2 at 544 -45.
131See LeBoulanger, supra note 2 at 546-47 (presuming that the term Aharmonisation@ was used for 
diplomatic reasons, but emphasizing that the OHADA business laws are truly unified).  See also KONÉ, supra note 3 
at 4-5 (discussing the difference between the European Union=s harmonization of laws, and the OHADA regime=s 
unification and uniformity of laws).  Of course, uniformity is not a panacea because uniformity in a bad direction is 
bad.  See, e.g., Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INT=L L. 671, 672 (1999) (noting 
that, perversely, uniformity can accentuate inefficient effects).
132Because OHADA offers business laws but is not a customs union, OHADA does not limit the member-
states; ability to establish independent trade policy, for example.
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member-states will have lower transaction costs if they need not worry about national variations, 
thereby encouraging trade.133  The second step is that these uniformly interpreted laws must be 
enforced.  We will look first at the interpretation problem and then briefly at enforcement.
1. Uniform Interpretation through Supranational Structures
The simple adoption of uniform laws is a relinquishment of sovereignty contemplated by
the OHADA treaty: a law that OHADA adopts is automatically and immediately an internal law 
of each of OHADA=s member-states.134  To accept a uniform interpretation and enforcement 
represents another significant step in the same direction.  At this point, it is worth pausing to 
consider why national elites would have allowed the OHADA project to exist at all.  The answer 
is fraught with speculation, but a legal professional who is from the OHADA territory and who 
was deeply involved at OHADA=s earliest stages indicates that the political leaders in the region 
really did understand OHADA to be pro-development and had been deeply worried by the 
economic downturn of the early 1990s.135  It may also be that the elites recognized that the 
OHADA laws= nuanced balancing act protects the elites.   Elites may typically be majority 
133That, of course, was the logic behind the uniform laws in the United States, and the UN Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, Apr. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, Annex I, reprinted in 19 I.L.M.  These are only business laws 
relating to private ordering, thus they do not prevent a government from imposing on trade whatever social or 
economic linkages its political system prefers.  See also supra note 132 (specifically mentioning the freedom of each 
OHADA member-states to establish independent trade policies).
134See OHADA Treaty, Art. 10 (explicitly stating that the uniform acts adopted pursuant to the treaty are 
directly and mandatorily applicable in the member-states).  The CCJA has explicitly ruled that the OHADA Treaty 
abrogates national laws that contrary to, and even merely identical with, the OHADA laws.  See KONÉ, supra note 3 
at 5 (describing two rulings of the CCJA, one in response to a request by the Ivoirian government, and the other as a 
result of the court=s review of an intra-State arbitration).  For scholarly recognition that OHADA implicates at least a 
limited waiver of sovereignty, see Forneris, supra note 1 at 9-10.
135Interview with Pres. Kéba Mbaye, Dakar, June 25, 2004.  See also supra note 2 & 68 (referring to the 
articulated goal of OHADA, viz., increasing foreign investment).
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holders in domestic investments, but we have seen that they tend to have minority positions when 
foreign investors are involved.136  A neutral law can protect their own holdings in both 
circumstances.
The other reason why the national elites, including the national governments, accepted the 
relinquishment of sovereign authority is almost certainly because of the manner in which the 
OHADA drafters structured the new regime.  As we will see, it is the triumph of structure and 
procedure, deployed in the service of substance.  OHADA is not just a system of uniform laws; it 
is a unified legal system designed to protect and enhance the pro-investment qualities of the 
OHADA laws.  It accomplishes this by erecting an entire legislative and judicial structure that 
formulates and interprets the OHADA laws, and prepares them for enforcement.
a.  CCJA.  The OHADA Treaty awards the interpretive function to the ACour Commune 
de Justice et d=Arbitrage@ (the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration), commonly known as 
the CCJA.  This court is a complete judicial system that is supranational within the OHADA 
territory and operates parallel to the national systems.  The CCJA has two principal roles with 
respect to the business laws adopted under OHADA: it offers a forum for international arbitrage, 
and it also serves as the court of last resort for judgments rendered and arbitrations instituted 
within State-members.137  Its role as forum for international arbitrage remains undeveloped, in 
part because of significant competition from both governmental138 and non-governmental 
136Lavelle, supra, note 117.  See also supra part II.A.2.b.
137See, e.g., LeBoulanger, supra note 2 at 551 (concerning the CCJA=s dual roles).  See also infra note 140 
(discussing the extent of, and limitations on, the CCJA=s supranational authority).
138Interview with Pres. Dr. François Komoin, Abidjan, June 29, 2004 (referring to the arbitral court of the 
Côte d=Ivoire, located in Abidjan).
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groups.139  Its role as final arbiter is its contribution to effective uniformity.  
 Because the CCJA preserves the uniformity of the OHADA laws through its final say,140
 it truly represents a transfer of indicia of national sovereignty to a supranational authority.141  No 
matter where the cause of action arises, if the CCJA has jurisdiction over the matter, the Treaty 
requires the national supreme courts to forward the case to the CCJA located in Abidjan, Côte 
d=Ivoire.142  This ensures that any decisions under the OHADA laws will occur outside the 
existing, often authoritarian and extractive national institutions, a significant concept in 
development-talk.143
This is not to say that the role of the CCJA even as interpreter of OHADA laws is yet 
139Interview with Mr. SADJO Ousmanou, in Douala, Cameroon, on July 6, 2004 (discussing the arbitral 
procedures of the Groupement Inter-patronal du Cameroun (GICAM), an association of employers). 
140See LeBoulanger, supra note 2 at 551.  The CCJA=s rule as court of last resort with respect to intra-State 
arbitrations is as a court of cassation (it cannot modify a lower tribunal=s decision, but it can reject it).  See Forneris, 
supra note 1 at 3.  A limitation on the CCJA=s authority is that it cannot impose penal sanctions; that is the role of the 
individual States.  OHADA Treaty, art. 5.  See also Issa-Sayegh, Intégration, supra note 1 (discussing the penal-
sanction limitation, and suggesting a reform to wholly remove any penal authority from the CCJA).  See also
SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 232-38 (discussing penal sanctions in the context of corporate law, specifically).
Another way in which the CCJA assists in establishing uniform business laws, is by advising the legislative 
branch, the Conseil des Ministres.  See, e.g., BUSLAW, supra note 1 at 13. For a discussion of the Conseil des 
Ministres, see infra, Part II.B.1.c.
141The CCJA has explicitly ruled that the OHADA Treaty abrogates national laws that are contrary to, and 
even merely identical with, the OHADA laws.  See KONÉ, supra note 3 at 5 (describing two rulings of the CCJA, one 
in response to a request by the Ivoirian government, and the other as a result of the court=s review of an intra-State 
arbitration).  For scholarly recognition that OHADA implicates at least a limited waiver of sovereignty, see Forneris, 
supra note 1at 9-10.
142See email communication with Me. TT (Aug. 9, 2004; on file with author) (interpreting the jurisdiction of
the CCJA to cover questions concerning the application of OHADA laws, instead of all disputes to be decided 
pursuant to OHADA laws); but see email communication from Prof. Joseph Issa-Sayegh (Oct. 9, 2004; on file with 
author) (stating that the CCJA=s jurisdiction includes both interpretation and application of the OHADA uniform 
acts, but noting the difficulty when more than one legal system is involved in a single cause of action). 
143For a suggestion that a national judicial system may be coopted, at least in part by political forces, see
Amnesty International, Press Release (Jan. 26, 2004), available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/FRAAFR310012004 (downloaded Mar. 30, 2004) (describing allegations of 
human rights abuses that the Côte d=Ivoire has not investigated despite the government=s promise in the Jan. 24, 2003 
Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement).
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fully settled.  National supreme courts are jealous of their authority.  Justices are concerned that 
they will not have enough work, or at least not enough interesting work, if all matters relating to 
commerce pass directly from the national appellate courts to the CCJA, thus by-passing the 
national supreme courts entirely.144  If the CCJA does have this overarching role as many who 
have studied the OHADA Treaty believe, then the CCJA will indeed be able to protect the laws=
uniformity.  What is factually obvious, however, is that the national supreme courts are in fact 
not sending all their business-related cases to the CCJA, and the parties apparently often do not 
insist that their case be removed.  The supreme courts= motivation is clear enough; legal 
professionals within the region confirm that parties are equally reticent due to the perceived cost 
of removing the final appeal to the CCJA in Abidjan.145 The fact that the vast majority of appeals 
to the CCJA come from the Côte d=Ivoire supports that conclusion.146
Until the OHADA structure finds a way to reassure non-Ivoirians on the expense front, it 
will be unlikely that the CCJA will play the fullest possible role in support of uniformity.  Added 
to this possible practical impediment to full realization of the CCJA is a problem created by the 
text.  Certain legal professionals suggest that the Treaty gives the CCJA jurisdiction only to hear 
144Interview with Pres Seydou BA, president of the CCJA, in Abidjan on June 29, 2004 (noting that he has 
good relations with the supreme court of Côte d=Ivoire); Interview with Pres. Kouassi Kouadio, Magistrate, in 
Abidjan on June 29, 2004 (stating that the Côte d=Ivoire=s supreme court perceives itself to be the only one to refer 
cases to the CCJA).
145Interview with Me. HT, supra note 72 (noting that non-Ivorian supreme courts within the OHADA 
territory ignore the CCJA); interview with Lord Justice Fonkwe J.F., in Yaoundé, Cameroon, on July 9, 2004 
(indicating that, presumably, some supreme courts fail to refer cases to the CCJA for fear of losing the more 
interesting cases).
146Interview with Pres Ba, supra note 144 (asserting that 90% of CCJA cases come from Ivorian parties; he 
suspects that if two parties are from the same country other than Côte d=Ivoire, they will take their case to their own 
supreme court).
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questions of interpretation, not all matters having arisen under OHADA laws.147 If that is the 
case, the CCJA will still have a significant role to play in maintaining uniformity, but only at a 
remove.  That is, after a national court has adopted a particular interpretation and rendered a 
decision, the CCJA would finally have its opportunity to review the interpretationBbut only if a 
national government or a party were to call on the CCJA to announce the definitive 
understanding.
b.  ERSUMA.  Another structure that OHADA has established is a regional school, the 
Ecole Régionale Supérieure de la Magistrature, which is designed to educate the legal 
professionals of the OHADA territory.  This institution reinforces norms as it imparts substantive 
legal knowledge.148  OHADA even publishes cases and provides legal texts; before the advent of 
OHADA lawyers and even judges could remain ignorant of the status of entire bodies of law, 
including the bankruptcy-law regime.149   The principal criticism of OHADA=s education mission 
is that it does not have the resources to do enough.  In anglophone Cameroon, for example, many 
sitting judges did not know about OHADA until after the first OHADA laws were already in 
effect.  The judges were furious and embarrassed to have learned about OHADA for the first 
time not from the government or from OHADA, but rather from counsel pleading a case.150
c.  Conseil des Ministres (Council of Ministers).  The OHADA structure is a brilliant 
147See Me. TT email, supra note 142 (asserting that the CCJA=s jurisdiction is limited to interpretation).
148See generally, BUSLAW, supra note 1at 16-17 (noting that a purpose of the school is to promote the use 
of the OHADA regime of business laws).
149See Forneris, supra note 1at 7-8 (reporting that a judge had vaguely remembered a bankruptcy law from 
twenty years before, but did not know what its current status was).
150Interview with Mrs. FON ACHU Helen, Magistrate, Douala, Cameroon, July 7, 2004.
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coup, both as a conceptual and as a procedural matter.  In fairness, however, it is not without 
moral difficulty.  Specifically, anyone who moderates from a purely universalist position will 
recognize that the OHADA system is aggressively top-down, and that it inserts an aggressively 
Western/Northern legal system.
The OHADA drafters assert that OHADA enhances pre-OHADA business law by 
updating texts, some of which were more than a century old, and most of which had not been 
reviewed post-independence.151  The member-states of OHADA wanted a Western/Northern 
system, not a customary or traditional one, for the more complex commercial transactions that 
they wished to facilitate.  They believe that foreign investors will be more comfortable with an 
essentially familiar system; in all likelihood, it would substantially reduce transaction costs.152
The OHADA proponents also point out that the decision to adopt the OHADA system has been 
151There were exceptions, but among the OHADA member-states, only Senegal, Guinea and Mali attempted 
a systematic review of business laws between independence and the OHADA Treaty in 1993.  See KONÉ, supra note 
3 at 10-11 (noting that the primary corporate law was based on French laws of 1867).
152See supra note 2 and the introduction to Part II (concerning the drafters= effort to reduce investors=
transaction costs).  See also Undated Interview with Judge Kéba Mbaye, one of three members of the original 
drafting committee (ADirectoire@), http://www.afrology.com/eco/kebam.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2005; first read 
Sept. 22, 2003): A[L]es entrepreneurs m'ont répondu, partout, pratiquement la même chose : >Nous ne voulons pas 
investir parce que nous ne connaissons pas quel est le droit qui va régir notre patrimoine. Vous allez dans un pays, 
vous demandez quel est le droit qui vous permet de créer aujourd'hui une société anonyme, personne ne le sait. Il y a 
pire. Une fois que nous arrivons à détecter, dans certains pays, quel est le droit applicable pour la création de notre 
entreprise, pour sa viabilité et, au cas où surviendrait un jour un différend, pour la manière dont ce différend doit être 
réglé, nous avons toujours des surprises considérables. Le même droit n'est pas applicable d'un pays à un autre, d'un 
tribunal à un autre. On ne tient pas compte de la jurisprudence. Et, généralement, nous sommes toujours les victimes 
de cette situation, c'est ce qui explique notre hésitation à continuer à investir.= C'est alors que j'ai utilisé l'expression 
qui a eu ensuite une certaine fortune : >en réalité, ce qui empêche les investissements, c'est l'insécurité juridique et 
judiciaire.= @
Some critical theorists question the existence of Atraditional@ cultures and of Amodernity@, pointing out that 
these concepts are matters of perspective, and suggesting that a better approach to understanding what is necessary to 
a region=s development is to establish a dialogue.  See, e.g., Vincent Tucker, The Myth of Development: A Critique 
of a Eurocentric Discourse, in CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A NEW PARADIGM (Ronaldo 
Munck & Denis O=Hearn, eds., 1999) at 1, 8-9, 17-21.
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legitimated by democratic procedure.153  The national parliaments approved the 1993 treaty, and 
the national governments still play a consultative role in the creation of new OHADA laws.154
Admittedly less democratic is the fact that the OHADA legislative body, the Conseil des 
Ministres (the Council of Ministers), is composed of Justice and Finance Ministers and thus is at 
least one step removed from the electorate.155  And the national structures that have adopted the 
entire system, including the parliaments, manifest varying levels of democratic participation, 
depending on the particular country.156
This non-democratic aspect is a weakness of the OHADA structure as confirmed by the 
desirable factors identified by our review of comparative law.  A pro-investment structure must 
protect propertyBa mission the OHADA laws and structure appear ready to accomplishBbut it 
must also shelter commercial transactions from local extractive impulses.  On the latter issue, the 
Treaty=s delegation of  the legislative role to senior officials of the national governments looks 
like a very pragmatic trade-off: the governments approved a treaty that restricts national 
sovereignty through legislation, in exchange for some direct governmental control over that 
153See Berkowitz et al., supra note 52 at 188-90 (asseting the importance of voluntary receipt of a legal 
system, and in particular of adapting that system to the host locale=s social and economic environment).
154OHADA Treaty, arts. 6 & 7 (calling for Aconcertation avec les gouvernements des Etats parties@, and also 
advice from the CCJA, before the Conseil des Ministres approves a uniform law).  Most of the States-members have 
set up a committed made up of Arepresentatives from their legal and judicial professions, the academia, line 
ministries and parliament.@  Forneris, supra note 1at 11.
155See, e.g., BUSLAW, supra note 1 at 8.
156For 2004, Freedom House ranked three OHADA countries as Afree,@ six as Apartly free,@ and seven as 
Anot free.@ See Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2005, Table of Independent Countries, Comparative 
Measures of Freedom, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2005/table2005.pdf 
(downloaded Mar. 4, 2005) (listing countries= performance from Dec. 1, 2003 through Nov. 30, 2004; the measures 
are based on an assessment of Apolitical rights@ and Acivil liberties@).  Senegal was listed as Afree,@ but Cameroon and 
Côte d=Ivoire were Anot free.@ Id.
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legislation.  More to the point, as a practical matter the cost in lost democracy is not great at least 
for now.  It is true that, if a national government is non-democratic, its ministers necessarily will 
be so also.  In such a situation, the national parliament is either equally undemocratic, or it is 
supine, or both.  I am not being flip here.  Without pointing fingers at any particular nation, if a 
country is considered undemocratic, the undemocratic characteristics of the executive will 
necessarily affect the national legislature.
d.  Permanent Secretariat.  In the face of the OHADA structure=s undemocratic aspects, 
the administrators of OHADA, the Permanent Secretariat, have devised a pragmatic unofficial 
channel for public response.  These are the so-called Anational commissions.@  Not established by 
the Treaty, these commissions have evolved because they are necessary.  In the Côte d=Ivoire, for 
example, the very energetic head of the Ivorian national commission is actively soliciting 
recommendations for improvements to existing codes.157  Because the committee consists of 
legal professionals, they do reflect at least a sliver of informed popular opinion, and contribute to 
at least some popular buy-in for the OHADA laws. 
2. Enforcement.
No matter how elegantly it is drafted, a statute is only as effective as its enforcement.  We 
have seen that the OHADA laws= uniformity throughout the territory is protected by the CCJA=s 
authority to interpret.  Execution of judgments, on the other hand, inevitably require an interface 
between the OHADA regime and national judicial system.  Once a court has rendered its 
judgment under OHADA laws, the nation=s bailiff has to levy, and quarrels about the execution 
157Interview with Pres. Kouassi Kouadio, Magistrate, supra note 144.
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of the judgment end up in national courts.158
Indeed, enforcement is a topic of significant interest to the local legal profession, as 
demonstrated in the interviews I conducted in the summer of 2004 with practitioners, in-house 
counsel, judges and professors located in the OHADA territory.  The study was preliminary and 
the information anecdotal, but the interlocutors= focus was, strikingly, on the implementation of 
the laws.159  The interviewees had acceptedBeven embracedBthe reality of the OHADA.  For 
example, a common refrain among the francophone legal specialists was to praise the clarity and 
sophistication of the OHADA laws, but to lament the difficulty of obtaining execution on the 
judgments.160  The issue arises at the junction where the parallel legal universe touches the 
national system, that is, at the point where the judgments rendered by the national courts have 
gone through their final appeal, whether or not to the CCJA.  It can even be difficult to ascertain 
which national authority is responsible for the execution of judgments under OHADA laws.161
158See, e.g., Interview with Justice NKO T. Irene NJOYA, Advocate General, South West Court of Appeal, 
in Buéa, Cameroon, on July 8, 2004.
159For a general description of the interviewing process, see supra note 6.  In a subsequent study, I will 
focus on the interface of OHADA in anglophone regions, including anglophone Cameroon, Ghana and Nigeria.  The 
ease with which the French-based OHADA system is received in anglophone (common law) regions may provide 
additional information not only about OHADA=s probable evolution, but also about the accuracy of the assertions 
about French-based law being an ineffective and even perhaps destructive transplant.  See, e.g., the discussion in Part 
I.B.
160However, the clarity of OHADA laws may be enough to make them useful despite execution difficulties.  
See Interview with Me. QT, Douala, Cameroon, on July 5, 2004 (suggesting that the government controls the 
prosecutor who controls the police which controls execution of judgments); Interview with Me. BK, supra note 72 
(emphasizing the importance of effective judgment-execution, but also praising the OHADA laws= clarity).
161Henri Tchantchou, Le Contentieux de l=Exécution et des Saisies dans le Nouveau Droit OHADA (article 
49 AUPSRVE), 46 JURIDIS PÉRIODIQUE (Apr.-June 2001), available at 
http://www.ohada.com/imprimable.php?vu=11&article_biblio=447 (2001) (discussing the difficulty of identifying 
the local, non-OHADA authority responsible for ordering the execution of judgments in Cameroon, particularly in 
anglophone Cameroon).  In anglophone Cameroon, the writ of fi fa (Afieri facias@) has been replaced by the new 
Aexecutory formula@ (Aformule exécutoire@) and stamp.  Interview with Justice NKO, supra note 158.
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It may seem like a colossal waste of effort to spend time and energy discussing a legal 
system when execution of judgments remains uncertain.  On the other hand, it is reassuring that 
the legal profession is taking OHADA seriously enough to be discussing the niceties of 
judgment-execution.162  And judgments are being executed.  Further, it is important to appreciate 
that, with every step taken, the OHADA system becomes more fully woven into the commercial 
fabric of the region, and thus more difficult to reverse.  This in turn means that long-term benefits 
may still be reaped; it does not mean that no short-term benefits are available.
3. OHADA=s Immediate ASoft@ Benefits
Even when OHADA is not yet providing the Ahard@ benefit of judgments rendered and 
executed in a predictable and transparent manner, it is offering a soft but immediate benefit.  In 
Senegal, where the economy is growing at a respectable clip,163 indications are that the OHADA 
laws= consumers are beginning to recognize them as local laws, although foreign companies are 
resisting this perception.164  In the Côte d=Ivoire, which is still reeling under the civil strife that 
started in September 2002, members of the local legal profession seem to view the OHADA laws 
as a promise of better times.165  When, once again, commerce will be freely possible, the legal 
162Sylvain Souop, Pour Qui Sonne le Glas de l=Exécution Provisoire? A Propos du 2ième Arrêt de la CCJA, 
002-2001 du 11 octobre 2001, Affaire Epoux Karnib c/ Société Générale de Banques Côte dàIvoire (SGBCI), 
OHADATA D-02-06, also available at  http://www.ohada.com/imprimable.php?vu=28&article_biblio=293 (2002) 
(discussing risks created by provisional execution of judgments before all appeals are completed).
163Averaging at 5% real GDP growth from 1995 to 2003, and estimated at 5.5% in 2003.  Central 
Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, Senegal, Economy, available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sg.html#Econ (last visited October 24, 2004).
164Interview with Me. TT, supra note 72.
165Interviews with TE, DL &, QF, supra note 72.  The Côte d=Ivoire=s estimated real GDP growth is -1.9% 
for 2003.  Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, Senegal, Economy, available at  
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iv.html#con (last visited October 24, 2004).
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profession will be ready with a relatively clean, transparent judicial system to support commerce. 
 In Cameroon, the local legal professionals to all evidence experience OHADA somewhere 
between those two extremes.  For example, a well-respected Cameroonian scholar studying the 
OHADA regime has recognized that published decisions are prerequisites to a predictable and 
transparent judicial system.  Because the francophone region of Cameroon does not publish an 
official journal of decisions, he has taken on himself to do so.166  His efforts to promote 
transparency have gained particular importance as they parallel the anglophone region=s pre-
existing publication of cases.  These moves toward transparency are geared to increase 
predictability and reduce corruption.
On the other hand, it is clear that for many members of the legal profession in these 
countries, Agood governance@ means political governance, not corporate governance.167  Issues of 
good corporate governance are to all appearances almost at the level of luxury.  One member of 
the legal profession described political corruption at A500%@ in his country, but he also said that 
OHADA laws relating to creation and management of corporations were vastly clearer than the 
pre-existing law.168  It is hard to see the statements as consistent unless we understand the 
OHADA laws as partly aspirational.  Of course some OHADA judgments are executed, and 
166As a point of comparison, Cameroon=s estimated real GDP growth for 2003 is 4.2%.  Central Intelligence 
Agency, World Factbook, Senegal, Economy, available at  
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cm.html#Econ (last visited October 24, 2004).  Professor Paul-
Gérard Pougoué, Vice Rector in charge of teaching and professor in the Legal and Political Science Faculty at the 
University of Yaoundé II, publishes Juridis Périodique.  Interview with Prof Pougoué, supra note 95.
167Interview with Me. BK, supra note 72.
168Interview with Me. FB, supra note 88.
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some legal professionals do focus on corporate governance in the context of OHADA.169  Thus, 
OHADA is beginning to enhance transparency and protect property, but at least some of these 
benefits belong to the future.
III. OHADA=s LONG-TERM IMPACT
A. IMPACT TO-DATE
This survey suggests that although OHADA=s articulated purpose focuses on foreign 
investment, its implementation is supportive of domestic investment, as well.  On the procedural 
side OHADA is designed to avoid existing authoritarian structures, while on the substantive side 
it has established a structure to protect private property and enhance incentives for capital 
formation.  Specifically, the OHADA nations established a legislative and judicial system 
devoted to business laws, operating parallel to their national analogue.  In the late 1990s, 
OHADA adopted statutes, including a corporate law, conceived to encourage responsible 
behavior by management and to balance the interests of foreign and domestic investors.  The 
OHADA laws accomplish all this while retaining a simplicity compatible with an evolving legal 
infrastructure.  Thus, the OHADA regime in fact addresses concerns about the utility of civil-law 
models in developing countries that have been articulated by comparative law and development 
economics.  For example, OHADA=s laws and institutions protect property rights in private 
transactions by many means, including respecting both majority and minority owners and by 
emphasizing transparency.
The mere fact that OHADA=s drafters have consciously or unconsciously tracked those 
169Interview with Prof. Pougoué, supra note 95.
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theories gleaned from comparative law and development economics still does not prove that the 
theories are correct.  The question is how to measure the OHADA project=s success in achieving 
its goals of enhancing foreign investment, specifically,  and economic development generally.  
We have already seen anecdotal evidence that members of the legal profession within the 
OHADA territory are unsure of the laws= long-term future, but nevertheless remain supportive of 
its efforts.
Part of the measure of success is found in the OHADA system=s very existence.  The 
OHADA member-states have accomplished a great deal: sixteen (soon seventeen) countries have 
together constructed supranational institutions, including a legislature and a court, and have 
thereby implemented a system of uniform business laws throughout their joint territory.  We have 
seen that legal professionals within the OHADA territory do praise the value of the OHADA 
regime.170   Practicing lawyers, judges, academics, business people, and members of the OHADA 
institutional hierarchy, all of  whom live daily with the OHADA laws, expressed their support of 
and hope for the OHADA system.  In particular, they praise the laws= clarity.  
Otherwise, though, we have to recognize that any external measure will necessarily 
reflect far more than just the impact of the OHADA system.  In other words, a look at trends in 
foreign or domestic investment within the region, not to speak of gross national product, cannot 
alone be an accurate reflection of the OHADA=s success because of all the other factors that are 
relevant.171  However, the enumerated factors are not good: for almost all OHADA countries, per 
170See Interview with BK, supra note 72, and QT, supra note 160 (praising the OHADA laws= clarity); see 
also Interview with Prof. Assi-Esso, supra note 95 (praising OHADA laws= clarity, the rapidity of its procedure 
including in particular the execution of judgments).
171OHADA=s articulated purpose is to increase foreign investment.  See supra note 2.  However, the 
ultimate goal is not to allow the region to reap the benefits of additional investment.  For one view of the applicable 
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capita gross national product is less than US$ 700 per year,172 and only one OHADA country has 
exceeded two percent gross national product growth in the 1990s.  We can also consider changes 
in Transparency International=s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as a proxy for measuring the 
protection of private property.173  While a rising CPI cannot alone prove whether OHADA has 
been successful, the CPI during the period since the OHADA laws= adoption is not reassuring: 
the Côte d=Ivoire index has fallen perceptibly, and Cameroon has inched up, but only from a very 
low level.174
To be sure, the first OHADA laws have been effective only since 1998, a very brief 
experience in comparison with the duration of the institutions challenged by OHADA.175  Future 
research will focus on how regional, domestic enterprises are using OHADA, and how foreign 
criteria in measuring development, see supra note 10 (discussing in particular the views of Jeffrey Sachs and his co-
authors, and Amartya Sen).
172Only Gabon has exceeded US$700 per capita GNI in 2002 and 2003 (which it has accomplished 
handily).  See The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators: Data Query, available at 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/ (downloaded Jan. 30, 2005).  AGNI@ is Agross national income,@ the 
terminology that the World Bank now uses instead of AGDP@ (Agross domestic product@).  The World Bank defines 
GNI as follows: AGross national income (GNI) (formerly gross national product, or GNP) is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) that are not included in the valuation of output 
plus net receipts of income from abroad.@  The World Bank Group, Data & Statistics, Methodology, National 
Accounts: Output and Expenditure, available at http://www.worldbank.org/data/working/def7.html (downloaded Jan 
30, 2005).
173For a discussion of another, similar proxy, see William Easterly & Ross Levine, Africa=s Growth 
Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1203, 1209 (1997) (recommending the use of  the Ablack 
market exchange rate premium@ as a proxy for Atrade, exchange rate, and price distortions@).
174The cleanest OHADA state in the 2003 survey was Senegal at 3.2, putting it just about at the half-way 
mark of perceived corruption among the 133 tested nations.  The Côte d'Ivoire's index was 2.7 in the 2002 survey, 
describing 2001 [pre civil strife].  http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2002/2002.08.28.cpi.en.html 
(downloaded Oct. 9, 2003)
175See BUSLAW, supra note 1 at 34.  *[Registre du Commerce et du Crédit Mobilier (RCCM) is centralized 
at the national level, and again at the OHADA level; AU General Commercial, art. 20.]
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investors view the new regime.176  For the moment, however, the strongest positive indicator may 
be that anglophone countries have begun to enquire about joining.177  Given the historical friction 
between the anglophone and francophone former colonies, that is a remarkably promising sign.178
 It is thus worth considering briefly what additional steps OHADA should take in order to 
consolidate its ability to support economic development.
B. NEXT STEPS
We have seen that legal professionals within the OHADA territory praise in particular the 
laws= clarity.  Practicing lawyers, judges, academics, business people, and members of the 
OHADA institutional hierarchy, all of whom live daily with the OHADA laws, also expressed 
176Foreign investors in the OHADA territory do not necessarily use the OHADA form.  ExxonMobil formed 
a subsidiary, Esso Exploration and Production Chad Inc. (Esso-Chad), to build a $3.7 billion underground oil 
pipeline from Chad, through Cameroon, to the Atlantic.  Somini Sengupta, The Making of an African Petrostate 
(Feb. 18, 2004) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/04/business/worldbusiness/04fdi.html?pagewanted=print&position= (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2004).  While I do not know exactly when Esso-Chad was formed, it probably was not much before January 
2001.  See WORLD OIL (Jan. 2001) (referring to this Esso-Chad and discussing the commencement of an oil pipeline 
from Chad through Cameroon to the Atlantic coast) available at 
http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m3159/1_222/70204444/print.jhtml (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).  The OHADA 
corporate law was available since January of 1998.  See SOCCOM, supra note 85 at 17-18 (The OHADA corporate 
law (Le Droit des Sociétés Commerciales et du Groupement d=Intérêt Economique) entered into force on January 1, 
1998).  Because of the suffix AInc.@, Esso-Chad probably is a US company, and certainly is not formed under 
OHADA.  When I sought additional information on Esso-Chad, the public-relations department of ExxonMobil had 
no information and refused to put me in contact with the legal department.  See March 4, 2004 email from Russ A. 
Roberts, ExxonMobil Upstream Public Affairs.
177Cameroon, already a member of OHADA is bilingual English-French and has a dual legal system.  See 
supra note 6 (Cameroon as bilingual and charter member of OHADA).  See also BUSLAW, supra note 1 at 22-23 
(discussing Cameroon=s constitutional mandate of French-English bilingualism).  See also United Nations, Core 
Document Forming Part of the Reports of States Parties B Cameroon, HRI/CORE/1/Add. 109, Part II.A (June 19, 
2000), available at http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord2000/documentation/coredocs/hri-core-1-add109.htm (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2004) (AFrench and British colonial rule left Cameroon with a dual legal system, which has elements of the 
Napoleonic Code and common law. This duality is further complicated by the coexistence of customary and statutory 
law.@). Based on casual conversations with persons interested in West Africa generally and OHADA specifically, 
Ghana is generally considered most likely to be the first fully anglophone adherent, although negotiations are 
apparently ongoing with Nigeria as well.
178OHADA is open to all members of the African Union.  OHADA Treaty, art. 53 (the Organization of 
African Unity, in French, l=Organisation de l=Unité Africaine (OUA), is the predecessor to today=s African Union).
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two principal complaints.  First, the consumers of OHADA laws desire easier access to the court 
decisions and scholarly analysis of those laws.179   While a privately run website, 
www.ohada.com, includes texts of the code and of decisions, and makes scholarly commentary 
available for a fee, the Internet provides only limited access because of the unreliability of 
connection in many locales.180  In order to have a reliable, rapid connection to the Internet in 
Cameroon, for example, the only viable solution is a satellite hookup, which is relatively 
expensive.181
If the Internet is not part of the solution available to all, the principal alternative is 
published documentation; this solution costs money.  The OHADA Treaty as amended requires 
each state-party to contribute to the operations of the institutions.182  To date, these contributions 
have been honored in the breach, leaving the OHADA institutions underfunded.183  Therefore, 
they are not in a position to provide the documentation in published form, at least not in 
179These are, respectively, the classic Ajurisprudence@ and Adoctrine@ at the heart of French-system 
interpretation of codes and statutes.  See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, ET AL., supra note 35 at 280 (describing Adoctrine@ and 
Ajurisprudence,@ and underscoring their importance to French judicial decisions).  See also Merryman, Deviation, 
supra note 35 at 116 (asserting that French judges are not purely passive and do make law); Mitchel de S.-O-L=E 
Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1367-68, 
1371-75, 1381 (1995) (asserting the importance of precedent to French judges, while acknowledging that it still may 
be less so than to common law judges).
180There also exists an official website for OHADA: www.ohada.org.  This will in time contain essential 
information, including the Journal Officiel; however, much material remains to be uploaded.
181In Douala, Cameroon, for example, both Citibank and GICAM had satellite hook-ups.  Interview with 
Mr. SADJO, supra note 139; interview with Mrs. Alice Flora NGASSAM, Douala, Cameroon, on July 7, 2004.
182OHADA Treaty, Art. 43 (describing OHADA=s funding as including allocations from the member-states). 
See also Règlement No. 002/2003CM Relatif au Mécanisme de Financement Autonome de l=OHADA,Arts. 3 & 4 
(stipulating the allocation as 0.05% of imports from outside OHADA, supplied for consumption within the OHADA
territory); Décision, Conseil des Ministres, No. 004/2004/CM of March 27, 2004(stipulating the allocation among 
the member-states).
183Interview with Pres Kouassi Kouadio, supra note 144 [Abidjan, CIV, June 29, 2004].
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sufficient quantity.  A private non-governmental organization raises its own funds to commission 
and distribute documentation;184 it has donated literally thousands of copies of the OHADA 
uniform laws and analyses of those laws.  It has also contributed toward the regular publication 
of OHADA=s own Journal Officiel.  This is the official OHADA document that publishes 
decisions of the CCJA.  Further, the Permanent Secretariat is currently constructing a website on 
which the Journal Officiel will be posted.185  In other words, much is being done to make laws 
accessible.
Nevertheless, people who need to know about OHADA do not.  That includes potential 
foreign consumers of the legal system, as well as domestic users.  Within the region, the U.S. 
economic advisers to whom I spoke were aware of the OHADA laws= existence, but the reports 
they had obtained from U.S. investors were generally unfavorable, to all appearances in part 
based on whether the U.S. investors had won their latest litigation.186  The foreign investors and 
their national representatives must have easy access to current information about OHADA and its 
evolution.  
Local lawyers and business people, including in-house banking lawyers, too, must have 
complete and current information about OHADA.  For this, it is important to continue 
distributing books and articles.  However, it also is critical that ERSUMA, the OHADA school, 
184L=Association pour l=Unification du Droit en Afrique (UNIDA), 7, avenue de Ségur, 75007 Paris, France.
185Email of Feb. 24, 2005, from OHADA Permanent Secretary Lucien Johnson to the author (noting that the 
Journal Officiel will be posted at www.ohada.org; on file with author).
186Interview with Ms. Portia E. McCollum, Economics Counselor, Embassy of the United States, Abidjan, 
CIV, June 29, 2004; telephone conversation July 21, 2004 with Mr. Solomon Oshinaike, economic adviser, U.S. 
Consulate, Douala, Cameroon (reporting that US investors tend not to know about OHADA).
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have the resources to educate more professionals,187 and that the local academics and bar 
organize parallel educational opportunities, including regular seminars and workshops.  The 
Permanent Secretariat needs funding so that it can support these initiatives.
The legislative side, too, needs attention.  The Council of Ministers, with the Permanent 
Secretariat=s support, has been making good use of the national commissions.188  Again, too, it is 
important that the Permanent Secretariat have the resources necessary to enhance and monitor the 
national commissions.  These are critical to the feedback loop between OHADA=s legislative 
process and at least the legal professionals, if not the public at large.  In addition, they help the 
representatives to the Council of Ministers ascertain their national government=s position on 
relevant topics.189  In other words, they have a singular role in enhancing democratic aspects, and 
therefore the responsiveness, of the OHADA structure.  This is an area that is particularly 
sensitive, as it touches national sovereignty in a way that is instantly recognizable.  We have seen 
that laws adopted by the Council of Ministers automatically become internal law of OHADA=s 
member-states.190  The heads of state are, apparently, considering reviewing the existing structure 
under the treaty.191  In many of these OHADA countries, increasing the national executive=s 
supervisory role over OHADA will not increase democratic input.  Thus, it is important to 
187See supra Part II.B.1.b (describing ERSUMA).
188See supra Part II.B.1.c & d (discussing the Council of Ministers and, in the context of the Permanent 
Secretariat=s role, the national commissions).
189Interview with Pres. Kouassi Kouadio, supra note 144(suggesting the importance of OHADA to the 
national governments).
190See supra note 134 (describing the automatic application of OHADA laws).
191Interview with Pres. Kouassi Kouadio, supra note 144 (discussing the risk of intervention by heads of 
state in the evolution of OHADA, suggesting the importance of OHADA to the national governments).
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support and even formalize the national committees, and to leave them under the Council of 
Ministers= authority, while allocating administrative oversight to a reinforced Permanent 
Secretariat.
Clearly, one of the most difficult areas to address is OHADA=s judicial system.  The 
CCJA is well respected because the judges who sit on that court are sophisticated and, from all I 
have heard, serve with integrity.192  As the court continues to publish its own decisions, including 
detailed reference to the lower courts= decisions from which the appeal arose, the CCJA is 
automatically increasing transparency.  However, local legal professionals are quick to 
acknowledge that the CCJA=s transparency has not eradicated corruption in the national judicial 
systems.193  We have seen that the legal profession complains of a breakdown at the transition 
between the OHADA regime and the national judicial systems.  They report a lack of 
predictability when the local authorities are called upon to execute a judgment or arbitral 
award.194  Since the OHADA Treaty chose not to push the transfer of sovereignty to the point of 
establishing a separate OHADA method of enforcement, the practical impact of the OHADA 
laws, at least on the short term, depends on the will of the national governments.
This a difficult problem that even fundamental modifications in the OHADA judicial 
structure cannot immediately correct.  To all evidence, national governments that are already 
questioning an earlier concession of sovereignty pursuant to the OHADA treaty will not now 
192Interview with Me. Virgile NGASSAM Njike, in Douala, Cameroon, on July 3, 2004 (reporting that the 
Cameroonian bar admires the CCJA).
193Interview with Dr. François Komoin, supra note 138; Interview with FB, supra note 88.
194Interview with Justice NKO, supra note 158 (describing difficulties of judgment-execution); Interview 
with Pres. Kouassi Kouadio, supra note 144 (referring to judgment-execution as a mess).
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want to cede enforcement power.  If a national executive that is itself corrupt, as is the case in 
part of the territory, is prepared to punish judges who fail to rule as instructed by redeploying 
them to the least desirable courts in the country, no amount of transparency will, at least in the 
short run, provide effective shaming.195
On the other hand, any reform effort has to start somewhere.  Thus, ERSUMA=s 
education efforts and the related conferences can hope to have some effect on ethical 
perspectives.  There already is a cadre of professionals within the territory who are trying to 
behave ethically to have property and contracts recognized and respected; the OHADA regime 
provides support by the laws= clarity and through contacts to like-minded professionals.196  This 
may appear utopian, but it need not be interpreted that way.  Change can occur only if pressure is 
applied everywhere simultaneously, in search of the proper pressure-points.197
Interestingly, while the local lawyers and business people are perfectly aware of the 
national governments= negative impact on the application of the OHADA laws, even in countries 
with more impediments to commerce than in Senegal, these consumers of OHADA laws do not 
view the OHADA regime as useless.  As noted above, even these consumers uniformly expect 
195Interview with Me. QT, supra note 160 (referring to Achantage alimentaire,@ meaning blackmailing by 
threatening to cut off sustenanceBin this case career advancement).
196The theory of networks and of social influence are critical here.  See generally, Claire Moore Dickerson, 
Corporations As Cities: Targeting Nodes in Overlapping Networks, 29 J. CORP. L. 533, 544-551 (2004) (describing 
the power of networks).  See also Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360 (1973);
MARK BUCHANAN, NEXUS: SMALL WORLDS AND THE GROUNDBREAKING SCIENCE OF NETWORKS (2002); DUNCAN J. 
WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2003).
197This assertion is consistent with network theory.   See generally Dickerson, Overlapping 
Networks, (discussing the use of network theory to obtain institutional change, and recognizing the difficulty of 
identifying the relevant pressure points).
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that the OHADA laws would at some point in the future attain their full promise.198  Whether
that proves to be wishful thinking remains to be seen.  However, shoring up the existing 
structures will increase the likelihood of success.
So far, the bulk of the discussion has considered OHADA=s promise in the context of 
local economic development.  There is another, related aspect that was hinted at in the 
Introduction, and that emphasizes the importance of protecting another structure of OHADA: its 
uniformity within the territory.  
Countries in the South clearly are brutally aware of Northern influence.  Within this 
reality, OHADA represents an effort to take back the reins.  Measuring how that works on the 
ground is the next phase of my research, but I remain optimistic that the uniformity may be an 
effective, stealth weapon that will help empower the South in its discussions with the North.  If 
the region taken as a whole is commercially viable and possesses a single form of business laws, 
and if the entire region interprets and enforces them uniformly, individual countries will be able 
to require that foreign-based multinational corporations comply with local law if they are to 
invest anywhere in the region.  The territory could, for example, decide to adopt and apply an 
expansive definition of Acorporate interest,@ thus mobilizing a tool with which to protect its 
citizens and its environment.199  If the other assertions are not utopian, this one may be.  
However, what is utopian today can be reality tomorrow.
IV. CONCLUSION
198Interview with Me. QT, supra note 160 (noting that, even without an effective means of executing 
judgments, the OHADA laws and their clarity are a preparation for what is to follow).
199See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing Acorporate interest@).
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The OHADA legal regime is designed to help create a plausible economic climate.  It is a 
mechanism that generates business laws whose clarity is designed to provide guidance and thus 
predictability even when the supporting gloss of case law and scholarly commentary is hard to 
obtain.  Substantively, the laws are measured and favor neither the powerful nor the weak.
OHADA provides much more than laws, because it also has established fundamental 
legal institutions.  The Council of Ministers promulgates new laws and modifies old ones; its 
structure automatically includes the perspective of the national governments of member-states.  It 
is developing additional mechanisms to enhance its ability to obtain feedback from the legal 
professionals and business people who apply the OHADA laws.  The Common Court of Justice 
and Arbitration interprets the OHADA laws in order to preserve those laws= uniformity across the 
entire OHADA region.  This court also sets an example of transparency and skill.  With the 
support of the Permanent Secretariat, the regional school serves to reinforce and enhance all 
these efforts by providing continuing legal education.  In addition to these institutional efforts, 
legal professionals are developing informal networks that create a community of OHADA 
adherents, thereby confirming that OHADA is putting down roots.
In the process, OHADA gives lie to the view that French-based legal systems impede 
development.  There may indeed be a correlation between economic failure and such legal 
systems, but modern economic analysis suggests that there is no causation.  Indeed, since the 
OHADA countries have a civilian heritage, and since their legal professionals are steeped in 
civilian legal norms, a French-based system may well offer particular efficiencies there.200
200Because Cameroon is bilingual and bijural, the region also is a laboratory experimenting with the 
extension of the OHADA regime to English-language, common-law regions.  That is the object of another study.
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It is too early in the process to be dogmatic about OHADA=s success.  However, the 
commitment of legal professionals in the area, and the interest expressed by neighboring states 
speak to the new regime=s importance.  This process of education is proceeding apace.  The 
OHADA institutions and the legal professionals in the region are working on the transition 
between the OHADA regime and the national judicial systems, in particular in the area of 
execution of judgments.  As these efforts continue, the businesses and legal professionals in the 
capital exporting nations need to learn about the OHADA regime=s professionalism and promise. 
 This article is one step to that end.
